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*CONFIDENTIAL*  
*1st Draft*

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**SOURCES OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS  
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS  
IN AUSTRALIA, 1999:  
ANALYTIC REPORT (B)**

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Report to the  
Department of Employment, Work Relations, and Small Business

Report by Dr M.D.R. Evans and Professor Jonathan Kelley  
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## Executive summary

This is the second of a series of three reports on the Australian public's views about individual employment bargaining. These reports are based surveys of large, representative national samples collected by the International Social Science Survey/ Australia. The first report in the series showed that Australians hold a full spectrum of attitudes to individual bargaining, with some strongly favourable, some mildly favourable, some neutral, some opposed, and some strongly opposed. On average, Australian's attitudes are close to neutral, tilting neither towards the positive end, nor towards the negative end.

This, the second report in the series, takes the next step and asks who supports and who opposes individual employment contracts. Multivariate analysis reveals that a large number of separate factors shape the public's attitudes towards individual contracts:

Effects of deep background factors on support for individual bargaining:

- **Age** has a moderately important effect among working people, with senior workers less enthusiastic. Age has no effect among those not working. This is most likely a career-stage effect (with workers early in their careers more open to individual contracts) rather than an historical shift in favor of individual contracts.
- **Parents' political-party preferences** have a moderately important effect, with people who grew up in Coalition-supporting homes keener on individual bargaining. This is an indirect effect: it comes about because families shape their children's perceptions that poor people are economically capable, and their perceptions that business profits fuel economic growth, and these perceptions in turn shape views about individual contracts.
- Deep background factors that do not matter include: **gender, parents' education, father's occupation, size of place** of residence in youth, and **number of siblings**.

Effects of current demographic factors on support for individual bargaining:

- **Education** has no effect among employed Australians. But among non-working people, early school leavers have a more positive view of individual bargaining arrangements than their more educated peers. The effect is entirely indirect, operating through perceptions of the economic capabilities of the poor, perceptions of whether business profits fuel economic growth, trust in business, and attitudes towards trade unions.
- Current **size of place** of residence and **marital status** have no effect.

Effects of current job and workplace situation on support for individual bargaining:

- Most important effect: People in **manual occupations** are much less favourable. About one third of the total effect reflects blue collar workers' more pro-union attitudes and mistrust of business.
- 2nd most important effect: Workers in companies with poor **human resource management** are less favourable to individual contracts. Most of this is a direct effect: bad human resource management leads workers directly to the conclusion that individual contracts are a bad idea.
- 3<sup>rd</sup> place: **Job autonomy** makes workers more positive. But the effect is entirely indirect via perceived capabilities of the poor, and perceived role of monetary incentives in spurring economic growth.
- 4<sup>th</sup> place: People working in **non-profit** organisations outside direct government control are more dubious about individual bargaining than their peers in government employment, or in private sector for-profit employment.

- Surprisingly, **business owners** are no more supportive of individual contracts than are ordinary workers. Nor are **supervisors** more supportive than those they oversee.
- Workers in **large firms** are no different than those in small firms in their views about individual contracts.
- Other variables that had no effect: Job **security**, job **complexity**, **occupational status** (job quality), **hours worked**, **labour force experience**, **firm-specific experience**, and perceived risk that firm will **downsize** in the coming year. Importantly, **earnings** also have a null effect on attitudes towards individual contracts.

Effects of values about the legitimacy of different potential bases of reward :

- Those who cleave to the value that individual **diligence and effort** should be rewarded are significantly more supportive of individual contracts. But note that these effects are entirely indirect through perceptions of the economic capabilities of the poor and perceptions of the necessity of monetary reward to economic progress.
- Differences of opinion over the legitimacy of rewarding other personal traits or other job characteristics had no significant effect. In particular, Australians who think **family responsibilities** ought to be taken into account in pay setting , do not have distinct views on individual contracts. Nor do views about whether **wage rates should be the same in different firms** matter. Nor do workers with more **complex** or more **responsible** jobs differ from their peers in less demanding jobs.
- Taken together these results suggest that moral concerns over individual contracts are mainly centered on the legitimacy of differentiating wages among people doing similar tasks in one workplace. To the extent that they concern earnings differences between different occupations, indications are that the locus of moral concern is with the bottom of the occupational hierarchy rather than the top.

Perceptions play a major role in approval of individual contracts:

- Citizens who perceive **poor people as economically competent** are much more supportive of individual contracts.
- Australians who perceive **monetary rewards are necessary for economic growth** are much more supportive of individual contracts.

Effects of orientations towards key economic actors are also important:

- Citizens who hold generally **pro-trade union attitudes** are very much less supportive of individual contracts than are their peers holding anti-trade union attitudes. Note that it is attitudes that matter, not actual union membership; indeed, the effect is just as strong in the non-working population.
- Australians who have confidence and **trust in business** are somewhat more supportive of individual contracts. This effect is distinct from that of trade union attitudes, another indication that attitudes about individual bargaining are not rigidly aligned into a single, coherent ideology.

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## Introduction

After decades of centralised industrial relations, recent reforms in Australia and many other nations have begun to move towards decentralisation. This is the second of a series of three reports on the Australian public's views about industrial relations. These reports are based surveys of large, representative national samples collected by Australia's leading academic survey, the International Social Science Survey/ Australia (IsssA), in two surveys, one in 1999/2000 and a 2001 survey which is still in the field.

- The first report in the series, *Sources of Attitudes Towards Industrial Relations in Australia, 1999: Descriptive Report (A)*<sup>1</sup>, showed that a full spectrum of attitudes on this issue is represented among the Australian citizenry, with some strongly favourable, some mildly favourable, some neutral, some opposed, and some strongly opposed. On average, Australian's attitudes to individual bargaining are fairly close to neutral, tilting neither towards the positive end, nor towards the negative end.
- This second report in the series, *Sources of Attitudes Towards Industrial Relations in Australia, 1999: Analytic Report (B)*, takes the next step and asks who supports and who opposes individual contracts.
- The forthcoming third report in the series, *Sources of Attitudes Towards Industrial Relations in Australia, 2001: Recent Evidence (C)*, will draw on a battery of newly developed questions on the issues surrounding individual contracts, currently being fielded in the IsssA 2001 survey.

To see who supports and who opposes individual contracts, we use a nested sequence of multivariate analyses. Multivariate analysis is essentially a statistical filtering process that enables one to examine the separate, "pure" effect of partially overlapping or correlated variables. For example, one might wish to examine the separate impact of education and age on views on individual bargaining. If education and age were completely uncorrelated, one could learn their separate, pure linkages simply by looking at each in turn, ignoring the other. But, in practice, education and age are correlated (because people have been getting much more education in recent decades), so some kind of filtering process is necessary to sort out what is due to education and what is due to age – i.e. to their separate, independent effects. A great many of the socio-economic forces of interest in analyses of work and culture overlap to varying degree among themselves, so it is always prudent to focus on multivariate analyses. We estimate out multivariate model using ordinary least squares regression, a robust, multi-purpose tool suitable for the kinds of data we analyse (details are in the Technical Notes).

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Our analysis follows a nested logic, beginning with childhood factors and working forward in time and causal sequence to early adulthood, to general values and perceptions of the economy, and finally to evaluations of specific economic actors and policies:

- **Model 1 (deep background).** We begin by looking at the effects of enduring influences from youth and childhood, including age, gender, father's occupational status, parent's education, parent's political party, number of siblings, and whether one grew up in an urban area. We then assessing whether these deep background factors influence attitudes towards individual bargaining directly, or only indirectly through views that form later in life (specifically, those introduced in the following models).
- **Model 2 (recent background).** To the factors considered in model 1 we add information on circumstances later in life: current urban or rural residence, marital status, and education. We then examine their effects on views about individual bargaining, and assess whether the effects come about directly or indirectly through enduring values and perceptions.
- **Model 3 (job characteristics).** Next, we analyse the effects of one's job and workplace on attitudes toward individual contracts, once again mapping the total consequences and assessing the degree to which these effects operate directly, and to what degree their force is indirectly transmitted through intervening rewards, values, perceptions, and attitudes. In this analysis we include everything in Models 1 and 2 and, in addition, labour force experience, employer, government employee, employee of non-profit company, firm size, assessment of firm's human relations management, risk of downsizing, job security, supervisory role, job complexity, job autonomy, occupational status, blue-collar, hours worked, and experience in job.
- **Model 4 (earnings).** Earnings enters the analysis next, in addition to the variables considered in Models 1, 2 and 3. Earnings are of special interest since they are important in illuminating the role of self-interest in attitudes towards individual contracts. This matters because some policy preferences are heavily driven by altruistic concerns (and so are responsive to views about what is good for the society as a whole) while other policy preferences are driven by self-interest (and so are responsive to individual incentives and narrow 'hip-pocket' considerations).
- **Model 5 (legitimate reward).** Next come the values tapping the basic legitimacy of different reward systems. Specifically this includes the factors in models 1 to 4 plus views about whether effort and hard work should lead to higher rewards, whether family needs legitimate rewards, and whether comparisons with what others get for the same work in other firms or other industries should matter in setting pay.

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- **Model 6 (perceptions).** At the next stage, we enter perceptions concerning some key economic facts into the model. These include whether people believe the poor have the capability to help themselves, and views about whether profits are necessary for economic progress.
  - **Model 7 (unions and trust).** Finally we include, in addition to the variables of Models 1 to 6, more emotion-laden feelings about some of the key economic players: pro-union attitudes, trust in business, trust in government economic advice.

Thus, we have a nested series of 7 models, introducing variables in their presumed causal order beginning with childhood's deep background factors and ending with contemporary feelings about unions and other economic actors. Details are in the Technical Notes.

In exploratory analysis, we examined a wider range of variables than those we included in the final models. Of the logically relevant variables we retained those that had significant effects in the exploratory analysis together with several whose absence of effect is sufficiently important that it warrants special notice (notably the lack of any earnings effect).

### **Are the Roots Deep? Regression Analysis**

Some attitudes are the enduring consequences of youth and childhood experiences and so difficult to alter by current programs and policies. Other attitudes are contemporaneously formed, and so at least potentially open to alteration by current events, policy changes, and program innovations. What about attitudes towards industrial relations?

**Age.** We find a moderately important age effect among working people, such that older people are less supportive of individual agreements (standardised regression coefficient of  $-0.12$  in Model 1 in Table 1. The effect of age retains statistical significance and scarcely changes in size when many other variables are entered into the equation in subsequent models. Thus, it is not the lesser education, or more secure jobs, or even different work-related values of senior workers that turns them against individual bargaining, but rather something else.

Table 1. Age: Standardised regression coefficients of age in nested models predicting attitudes towards individual bargaining, from models estimated separately for the working population and for non-working people, Australia 1999/2000.

Causal variable: Age	Model 1: Deep background	Model 2: (1) + Recent background	Model 3: (2) + Job characteristics	Model 4: (3) + Earnings	Model 5: (4) + Legit- imate reward	Model 6: (5) + Perceptions	Model 7: (6) + Unions + Trust
Population analyzed:							
Working people	-0.124	-0.138	-0.134	-0.137	-0.136	-0.136	-0.137
Non-working	ns	ns	--	ns	ns	ns	ns

Note: Model 3 adds in current work characteristics, so it is not estimated for non-working people.

Source: International Social Science Survey/ Australia, 1999/2000.

Dependent variable: 5-point agree/disagree scale of answers on the statement "Employers should have the right to negotiate earnings with each individual worker."

Contents: Standardised regression coefficients from multivariate models. Models are nested with an expanded array of other variables held constant at each stage. Detailed results are in the Technical Notes.

Model 1 (Deep background): Individual contract attitudes = f(Age, Male, Father's occupational status, Parent's education, Parent's Political party, Number of siblings, Grew up in an urban area).

Model 2 (Recent background): Model 1 + Urban resident currently, Married, Education.

Model 3 (Job characteristics): Model 2 + Labor force experience, Employer, Government employee, Employee of non-profit company, firm size, Assessment of firm's human relations management, Risk of downsizing, Job security, Supervisory role, Job complexity, Job autonomy, Occupational status, Blue-collar, Hours worked, Experience in job.

Model 4 (Earnings): Model 3 + earnings.

Model 5 (Legitimate reward): Model 4 + Effort legitimates reward, Family needs legitimate reward, Comparisons with others legitimate reward.

Model 6 (Perceptions): Model 5 + Perceived capability of poor, Perceived necessity of profit.

Model 7 (Unions & trust): Model 6 + Pro-union attitudes, Trust in business, Trust in government economic advice.

This analysis does not show for certain whether the greater enthusiasm of younger people for individual working arrangements is a "vintage"/ "cohort" effect or an "age"/ "life-cycle" effect. The difficulty is that this analysis is based on only one cross-section and we would need another survey at a later point in time to sort out the issue. But it is an important issue:

- A "vintage" or "cohort" effect is one where attitudes are strongly shaped by the climate of opinion and objective circumstances of one's youth, but nearly set in stone by early adulthood, and maintained throughout life. If that is what the age effect is, then we can expect steady change in the overall climate of opinion as older cohorts leave the labour force and are replaced by new, more pro-reform, cohorts.
- An "age" or "life-cycle" effect is one where attitudes reflect one's stage in the life cycle. For example they may reflect younger worker's greater ease of changing employer, their greater flexibility as to where they live, and their greater propensity to regard a job as only a temporary commitment. If that is what the age effect is, then there is no reason to expect the overall climate of opinion to change in future years. Instead workers now young will get older and adopt the attitudes typical of older workers, while

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they are replaced in the work-force by a new crop of young workers with attitudes typical of the young.

There is an important clue that this is an age/life-cycle effect, arguably reflecting differential vulnerabilities at different career stages. If it were a “vintage effect”, the same age pattern ought to be evident among both the employed and the non-employed populations. But, in fact, the effect is present in the employed population and absent in the non-employed population (Table 1). In other words, senior working people are more dubious than their juniors in the workforce, but older and younger non-working people do not differ in their opinions on individual retirement. This suggests an “age” or “life cycle” effect, because it is found among the employed, but not among those out of the labour force. That means that one is likely to see the same age pattern in future surveys as future generations move through their career cycles, rather than seeing the present younger generation retain its enthusiasm for individual contracts as it ages.

**Gender.** Because men and women continue to have somewhat different responsibilities and experiences, and because women are sometimes thought to find bargaining and confrontations more difficult than do men, we included gender in our deep-roots model (Model 1) and in subsequent models. But in fact, gender has near-zero bivariate correlations with attitudes towards individual bargaining both among working people, and in the non-working population (Technical Notes). Moreover, in the multivariate analysis, gender fails to have a significant impact on attitudes towards individual bargaining among working people (Models 1 through 7, Technical Notes). Moreover, the same null effect is found in the non-working population as well (Models 11 through 17, Technical Notes). So this appears to be an issue on which the balance of support and opposition is the same among women as among men.

In assessing the potential deep roots of attitudes towards individual bargaining, we also investigated a number of aspects of the family of origin that are known to have enduring impact on some attitudes and behaviours. These include **parents’ education**, father’s place in the occupational hierarchy (“**occupational status**”), **size of place** of residence (number of people in village, town, or city, etc), **number of siblings**. None of these had any impact on adults’ attitudes towards individual bargaining. In other words, the children of early school leavers had attitudes no different from the offspring of university graduates; labourers’ children held the same balance of positive and negative attitudes as is found among professionals’ children; children of the Bush are indistinguishable from children of the metropolis in these attitudes; and the same balance of support and opposition is found among only children as among those hailing from large families. But there is one aspect of family of origin that matters.

**Parents’ political party** has an enduring impact on their children’s attitudes towards individual bargaining, with people who grew up in Coalition-supporting homes tending to be keener on individual bargaining than people raised in Labor families (as shown by the standardised regression coefficient of 0.128 for working

people in Model 1 of Table 2). This is a moderately important effect, being of the same order of magnitude as the age effect (Table 1, above).

Table 2. Parent's political party: Standardised regression coefficients of parents' political party in nested models predicting attitudes towards individual bargaining, from models estimated separately for the working population and for non-working people, Australia 1999/2000.

Causal variable: Parent's political party	Model 1: Deep background	Model 2: (1) + Recent background	Model 3: (2) + Job characteristics	Model 4: (3) + Earnings	Model 5: (4) + Legit- imate reward	Model 6: (5) + Perceptions	Model 7: (6) + Unions + Trust
Population analyzed: Working people	0.128	0.130	0.111	0.112	0.103	ns	ns
Non-working	0.180	0.196	--	0.189	0.141	ns	ns

Source: International Social Science Survey/ Australia, 1999/2000.

Note: Model 3 adds in current work characteristics, so it is not estimated for non-working people.

Dependent variable: 5-point agree/disagree scale of answers on the statement "Employers should have the right to negotiate earnings with each individual worker."

Contents: Standardised regression coefficients from multivariate models. Models are nested with an expanded array of other variables held constant at each stage. Detailed results are in the Technical Notes.

Model 1 (Deep background): Individual contract attitudes = f(Age, Male, Father's occupational status, Parent's education, Parent's Political party, Number of siblings, Grew up in an urban area).

Model 2 (Recent background): Model 1 + Urban resident currently, Married, Education.

Model 3 (Job characteristics): Model 2 + Labor force experience, Employer, Government employee, Employee of non-profit company, firm size, Assessment of firm's human relations management, Risk of downsizing, Job security, Supervisory role, Job complexity, Job autonomy, Occupational status, Blue-collar, Hours worked, Experience in job.

Model 4 (Earnings): Model 3 + earnings.

Model 5 (Legitimate reward): Model 4 + Effort legitimates reward, Family needs legitimate reward, Comparisons with others legitimate reward.

Model 6 (Perceptions): Model 5 + Perceived capability of poor, Perceived necessity of profit.

Model 7 (Unions & trust): Model 6 + Pro-union attitudes, Trust in business, Trust in government economic advice.

What is it about parents' party that matters? We can gain insight by tracing the effect through the nested models, to see which subsequent variables account for its effect.

- One's own education leaves it unchanged (Model 2), so educational successes and failures do not modify the attitudes acquired at one's parent's knees.
- Moreover, respondent's current work situation – incorporating many features of their job and their organisation – does not modify the impact of parents' political party decades later on attitudes towards individual bargaining (Model 3).
- Adjusting other factors for the importance of income also leaves the effect of parents' party untouched (Model 4).
- Even the inclusion of respondent's values on the legitimate bases of reward (Model 5) do not eliminate the enduring impact of parents' party.

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- It is only in Model 6, that we discover the secret of how parents' party works. In addition to all the other variables previously discussed, Model 6 also includes perceptions of the capacities of the poor and perceptions of whether business profits fuel economic growth, and with the inclusion of these variables, the effect of parents' party is no longer significant.

In other words, parents who favour the Coalition tend to inculcate perceptions that the poor are capable of standing on their own feet and perceptions that business profits feed future economic growth. In turn, these perceptions, increase support for individual bargaining. We'll discuss the impact of these perceptions in more detail below, but the important point for present purposes is that the effects of parents' party on attitudes towards individual bargaining are not set in stone, rather they are indirect effects that operate through these key perceptions. That means the effect of parents' party could be nullified by changing the perceptions.

All in all, the roots of attitudes towards individual bargaining do not appear to go very deep. The age pattern of differences in support for/ opposition to individual bargaining seems to reflect features of the career cycle, rather than enduring effects of the economic situation and climate of opinion in one's childhood and youth. There is a pronounced effect of parents' political-party preference, but it is an indirect effect that operates entirely through key perceptions about whether the poor are capable or not and about whether business profits enhance economic growth. There are no significant effects of any other measured aspect of family background.

### **Effects of Contemporary Background**

We have seen above that deep background forces from childhood and youth have only a limited impact on attitudes towards individual bargaining. What about more proximate background variables?

**Education**, being mainly located between childhood and adulthood, and having enduring impacts on many attitudes and values is a logical place to start. Education has no significant effect on the attitudes of working people, but exerts a moderately strong influence in the non-working population (as shown in Table 3 by the significant standardised regression coefficient of  $-0.144$  in Model 2). The influence is negative, indicating that, among those out of the workforce, highly educated people find individual bargaining a less attractive policy than do early school leavers.

Table 3. Education: Standardised regression coefficients of education in nested models predicting attitudes towards individual bargaining, from models estimated separately for the working population and for non-working people, Australia 1999/2000.							
Causal variable: Education	Model 1: Deep background	Model 2: (1) + Recent background	Model 3: (2) + Job characteristics	Model 4: (3) + Earnings	Model 5: (4) + Legit- imate reward	Model 6: (5) + Perceptions	Model 7: (6) + Unions + Trust
Population analyzed:							
Working people	--	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Non-working	--	-0.144	not	-0.148	-0.159	-0.105	ns

Source: International Social Science Survey/ Australia, 1999/2000.

Notes:

Education enters in Model 2 (the dashes indicate that it is omitted from Model 1).

Model 3 adds in current work characteristics, so it is not estimated for non-working people.

Dependent variable: 5-point agree/disagree scale of answers on the statement "Employers should have the right to negotiate earnings with each individual worker."

Contents: Standardised regression coefficients from multivariate models. Models are nested with an expanded array of other variables held constant at each stage. Detailed results are in the Technical Notes.

Model 1 (Deep background): Individual contract attitudes = f(Age, Male, Father's occupational status, Parent's education, Parent's Political party, Number of siblings, Grew up in an urban area).

Model 2 (Recent background): Model 1 + Urban resident currently, Married, Education.

Model 3 (Job characteristics): Model 2 + Labor force experience, Employer, Government employee, Employee of non-profit company, firm size, Assessment of firm's human relations management, Risk of downsizing, Job security, Supervisory role, Job complexity, Job autonomy, Occupational status, Blue-collar, Hours worked, Experience in job.

Model 4 (Earnings): Model 3 + earnings.

Model 5 (Legitimate reward): Model 4 + Effort legitimates reward, Family needs legitimate reward, Comparisons with others legitimate reward.

Model 6 (Perceptions): Model 5 + Perceived capability of poor, Perceived necessity of profit.

Model 7 (Unions & trust): Model 6 + Pro-union attitudes, Trust in business, Trust in government economic advice.

Clues about what puts highly educated non-workers off individual bargaining can be found by examining how the size of the coefficient changes across subsequent models, as additional variables are entered. The inclusion of income leaves education's effect unchanged (Table 3, Model 4). Moreover, education's effect is separate from views on the legitimate bases of reward (Model 5). But taking into account perceptions on whether the poor are basically capable people and on whether monetary incentives are necessary to economic progress reduces education's importance by about one third (Model 6). Finally, the effect of education is reduced to statistical insignificance by taking into account whether respondent trusts business and whether respondent is a supporter or opponent of trade unions (Model 7). In short, education's effects are entirely indirect, operating through perceptions and attitudes.

The other contemporary background effects we examined were present **place of residence** and **marital status**. Neither of these had a significant effect on attitudes towards individual bargaining in either the working or the non-working population.

## Effects of Job and Work Situation

We investigated many aspects of one's job and work situation which appear to have the potential to affect attitudes towards individual bargaining. Interestingly, only a few of them had significant effects, which means that the issue of individual bargaining is not as divisive on socioeconomic lines as one might have expected. There were four job and workplace characteristics that had significant influences: (1) whether one works in a manual or non-manual occupation, (2) the quality of human resources management in one's workplace, (3) the degree of autonomy one has on the job, and (4) whether one works in a non-profit organisation (Table 4). Let us take up each of these, in turn.

Table 4. Importance of the effects of different aspects of people's jobs on their attitude towards individual bargaining. Model 3. Importance indicated by standardised regression coefficients, Australia, 1999/2000.		
Rank	Variable (scoring; mnemonic in Technical Notes)	Importance
1	Blue collar: Whether R's occupation is non-manual or manual (0 or 1; BluCol)	-0.190
2	HR Quality: Quality of Human Resources management in the firm, 5-item scale (0 to 100; HRManag*).	0.140
3	Job Autonomy: Degree of self-direction at work, 4-item scale (0 to 100; JbAut*)	0.116
4	Works in non-profit organisation; reference category is for-profit private company (0 or 1; NonProfit)	-0.099
..	Works for government; reference category is for-profit private company (0 or 1; Govt)	ns
..	Employer: Owns business and employs others (0 or 1; Employer)	ns
..	Firm size: Number of employees in R's work organisation (#; FirmSize)	ns
..	Labour force experience: Years worked (#; LfExpX)	ns
..	Firm-specific experience: Years worked in this company (#; JobTenur)	ns
..	Job quality: R's ASCO detailed occupation recoded into Kelley's Worldwide Status Scale (0 to 100; OccStat)	ns
..	Job complexity: The complexity of R's tasks, 4-item scale (0 to 100; JbCmplx\$)	ns
..	Supervisory responsibilities: Extent of supervisory tasks (0 to 100; JbSuper*)	ns
..	Hours worked (#; WrkHrs2)	ns
..	Job security: (0 to 100; JobSecr*)	ns
..	Downsizing: Perceived probability that one's work organisation will downsize in the coming year (0 to 100; DownNext)	ns

Source: International Social Science Survey/ Australia, 1999/2000.

Notes:

Dependent variable: 5-point agree/disagree scale of answers on the statement "Employers should have the right to negotiate earnings with each individual worker."

Contents: Standardised regression coefficients from Model 3, which includes both deep and current background variables (Models 1 and 2) as controls. Detailed results are in the Technical Notes.

Multiple-item scales: item wording is in the Technical Notes.

**Manual work.** The most important aspect of job and work situation in forming attitudes towards individual bargaining is the divide between manual and non-manual workers (as shown by blue collar's standardised regression coefficient of -0.190). In concrete terms, white collar workers are 13 points out of 100 more positive towards individual bargaining than are blue collar workers (metric regression coefficient; see Model 3 in the Technical Notes). Because we included

a very broad array of work-related variables, this effect very probably speaks for itself rather than being a stand-in for some other characteristic. For example, education is controlled in the model, so manual workers greater opposition to individual bargaining cannot be attributed to their shorter exposure to the educational system. Similarly, complexity of tasks at work is controlled in the model, so it is safe to say that the observed blue collar/white collar divide on individual bargaining does not reflect differences in the average complexity of work done by manual and non-manual workers.

Table 5. Manual vs non-manual work: Standardised regression coefficients of manual vs non-manual work in nested models predicting attitudes towards individual bargaining, from models estimated for the working population, Australia 1999/2000.

Causal variable: Manual vs non-manual work	Model 1: Deep background	Model 2: (1) + Recent background	Model 3: (2) + Job characteristics	Model 4: (3) + Earnings	Model 5: (4) + Legitimate reward	Model 6: (5) + Perceptions	Model 7: (6) + Unions + Trust
Population analyzed: Working people	--	--	-.190	-.190	-0.169	-0.164	-0.124

Source: International Social Science Survey/ Australia, 1999/2000.

Notes:

Education enters in Model 2 (the dashes indicate that it is omitted from Model 1).

This variable does not apply to non-working people, so it is not included in their models.

Dependent variable: 5-point agree/disagree scale of answers on the statement "Employers should have the right to negotiate earnings with each individual worker."

Contents: Standardised regression coefficients from multivariate models. Models are nested with an expanded array of other variables held constant at each stage. Detailed results are in the Technical Notes.

Model 1 (Deep background): Individual contract attitudes = f(Age, Male, Father's occupational status, Parent's education, Parent's Political party, Number of siblings, Grew up in an urban area).

Model 2 (Recent background): Model 1 + Urban resident currently, Married, Education.

Model 3 (Job characteristics): Model 2 + Labor force experience, Employer, Government employee, Employee of non-profit company, firm size, Assessment of firm's human relations management, Risk of downsizing, Job security, Supervisory role, Job complexity, Job autonomy, Occupational status, Blue-collar, Hours worked, Experience in job.

Model 4 (Earnings): Model 3 + earnings.

Model 5 (Legitimate reward): Model 4 + Effort legitimates reward, Family needs legitimate reward, Comparisons with others legitimate reward.

Model 6 (Perceptions): Model 5 + Perceived capability of poor, Perceived necessity of profit.

Model 7 (Unions & trust): Model 6 + Pro-union attitudes, Trust in business, Trust in government economic advice.

Blue collar workers harbour a dislike for individual bargaining that is mostly distinct from the factors we have measured in our analysis (Table 4, Models 4 to 7):

- The divide between manual and non-manual workers over individual bargaining does not shrink when the effect of income is controlled (Model 4).

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- Taking values about the legitimate bases of reward into account only fractionally narrows the gap between blue and white collar working people (Model 5).
  - Importantly, taking into account perceptions about the capabilities of poor people and about whether business profit fuels economic growth does not narrow the remaining gap between those working in manual jobs and their peers in non-manual jobs (Model 6). This is important because it tells us that the fact that blue collar workers are relatively unenthusiastic about individual bargaining does not reflect concerns about the economic incapacity of the poor nor suspicion that business profits are wasted rather than fuelling economic growth. Something else separates the opinions of people working in manual and non-manual occupations.
  - Taking into account support for trade unions and trust in business further reduces the gap between blue and white collar working people to about two thirds its original size, but it remains statistically significant and of moderate size (Model 7). The important point here is that the greater mistrust with which manual workers view individual bargaining partly, but not wholly reflects their rather positive feelings towards trade unions; blue collar workers harbour a non-trivial kernel of disapprobation of individual bargaining that is completely apart from feelings about trade unions, and, moreover is separate from their trust or mistrust in business and separate from their trust in government.

**Quality of human resource management.** The second most important of the job-and-workplace effects is the quality of human resource management: people in well-managed organisations feel much more positive toward individual contracts than their peers in poorly managed organisations (Table 4). The standardised regression coefficient of 0.14 indicates a moderately important effect, about three-quarters as important as being in a blue collar occupation (-.19). In concrete terms, there is a wide gulf of 17 points out of 100 in approval of individual bargaining between those in the very worst managed organisations and those in the best (metric regression coefficient, Model 3, Technical Notes). In practice very few organisations are sufficiently badly managed to get ratings below 20 for their human relations practices, or well enough managed to get ratings over 90, so the usual gap would be closer to 10 points out of 100.

Table 6. Quality of human resource management: Standardised regression coefficients of quality of human resource management in nested models predicting attitudes towards individual bargaining, from models estimated for the working population, Australia 1999/2000.

Causal variable: Quality of human resource management	Model 1: Deep background	Model 2: (1) + Recent background	Model 3: (2) + Job characteristics	Model 4: (3) + Earnings	Model 5: (4) + Legitimate reward	Model 6: (5) + Perceptions	Model 7: (6) + Unions + Trust
Population analyzed: Working people	--	--	0.140	0.136	0.139	0.114	0.100

Source: International Social Science Survey/ Australia, 1999/2000.

Notes:

Dependent variable: 5-point agree/disagree scale of answers on the statement "Employers should have the right to negotiate earnings with each individual worker."

Contents: Standardised regression coefficients from multivariate models. Models are nested with an expanded array of other variables held constant at each stage. Detailed results are in the Technical Notes.

Model 1 (Deep background): Individual contract attitudes = f(Age, Male, Father's occupational status, Parent's education, Parent's Political party, Number of siblings, Grew up in an urban area).

Model 2 (Recent background): Model 1 + Urban resident currently, Married, Education.

Model 3 (Job characteristics): Model 2 + Labor force experience, Employer, Government employee, Employee of non-profit company, firm size, Assessment of firm's human relations management, Risk of downsizing, Job security, Supervisory role, Job complexity, Job autonomy, Occupational status, Blue-collar, Hours worked, Experience in job.

Model 4 (Earnings): Model 3 + earnings.

Model 5 (Legitimate reward): Model 4 + Effort legitimates reward, Family needs legitimate reward, Comparisons with others legitimate reward.

Model 6 (Perceptions): Model 5 + Perceived capability of poor, Perceived necessity of profit.

Model 7 (Unions & trust): Model 6 + Pro-union attitudes, Trust in business, Trust in government economic advice.

The effect of the quality of human resource management is unchanged when we introduce income into the analysis (Model 4, Table 6), which says good human resource management increases support for individual bargaining for reasons other than that more productive, better paying organisations tend to have better human resource managements. Nor does the fostering of support for individual bargaining come about because good human resource management enhances the legitimacy of rewarding productivity-related characteristics – the effect is virtually unchanged in Model 5. Moreover, the effect of good management on support for individual bargaining is largely separate from its influences on views about the capabilities of the poor and on whether business profits fuel economic growth: Entering these two variables into the equation whittles away at the effect of the quality of human resource management, but does not eliminate it. Rather, in Model 6, the standardised regression coefficient is about 80% of its original size (.114 compared to the original .140) . The importance of quality of human resource management is slightly reduced when trust in business, trust in government's economic judgment, and pro-union attitudes are taken into account (Model 7).

**Job autonomy.** Third in importance among the job-and-workplace influences is job autonomy, with people who exercise more self-direction at work feeling more positive about individual bargaining . This is a moderately important effect, as shown by the standardised regression coefficient of 0.116 (Model 3, Table 7).

Table 7. Job autonomy: Standardised regression coefficients of job autonomy in nested models predicting attitudes towards individual bargaining, from models estimated for the working population, Australia 1999/2000.

	Model 1: Deep background	Model 2: (1) + Recent background	Model 3: (2) + Job characteristics	Model 4: (3) + Earnings	Model 5: (4) + Legit- imate reward	Model 6: (5) + Perceptions	Model 7: (6) + Unions + Trust
Causal variable: Job autonomy							
Population analyzed: Working people	--	--	0.116	0.117	0.108	ns	ns

Source: International Social Science Survey/ Australia, 1999/2000.

Notes:

Dependent variable: 5-point agree/disagree scale of answers on the statement "Employers should have the right to negotiate earnings with each individual worker."

Contents: Standardised regression coefficients from multivariate models. Models are nested with an expanded array of other variables held constant at each stage. Detailed results are in the Technical Notes.

Model 1 (Deep background): Individual contract attitudes = f(Age, Male, Father's occupational status, Parent's education, Parent's Political party, Number of siblings, Grew up in an urban area).

Model 2 (Recent background): Model 1 + Urban resident currently, Married, Education.

Model 3 (Job characteristics): Model 2 + Labor force experience, Employer, Government employee, Employee of non-profit company, firm size, Assessment of firm's human relations management, Risk of downsizing, Job security, Supervisory role, Job complexity, Job autonomy, Occupational status, Blue-collar, Hours worked, Experience in job.

Model 4 (Earnings): Model 3 + earnings.

Model 5 (Legitimate reward): Model 4 + Effort legitimates reward, Family needs legitimate reward, Comparisons with others legitimate reward.

Model 6 (Perceptions): Model 5 + Perceived capability of poor, Perceived necessity of profit.

Model 7 (Unions & trust): Model 6 + Pro-union attitudes, Trust in business, Trust in government economic advice.

Taking income into account does not diminish the effect of job autonomy (Model 4), so the positive feelings that job autonomy generates about individual bargaining cannot be attributed to higher pay partially compensating for lower supervision costs. Moreover, the link between job autonomy and attitudes towards individual bargaining is unchanged when we take into account values about the legitimate bases of reward (Model 5, Table 6). But the effect of job autonomy on attitudes towards individual bargaining falls below statistical significance in the model taking into account perceptions of the capabilities of the poor and perceptions that business profits are reinvested and fuel economic growth (Model 6).

Employment in **non-profit organisation** is the 4<sup>th</sup> most important job-related influence on attitudes towards individual bargaining. This is an effect of middling importance (Model 3, Table 8), with people working in the non-profit sector (e.g. schools, hospitals, charities) being somewhat less enthusiastic about individual bargaining than are their peers in the for-profit private sector or in the government sector.

Table 8. Employed by non-profit organisation: Standardised regression coefficients of non-profit-organisation employment in nested models predicting attitudes towards individual bargaining, from models estimated for the working population, Australia 1999/2000.

Causal variable: Employed by non-profit organisation	Model 1: Deep background	Model 2: (1) + Recent background	Model 3: (2) + Job characteristics	Model 4: (3) + Earnings	Model 5: (4) + Legitimate reward	Model 6: (5) + Perceptions	Model 7: (6) + Unions + Trust
Population analyzed: Working people	--	--	-0.099	-0.096	ns	ns	ns

Source: International Social Science Survey/ Australia, 1999/2000.

Notes:

Dependent variable: 5-point agree/disagree scale of answers on the statement "Employers should have the right to negotiate earnings with each individual worker."

Contents: Standardised regression coefficients from multivariate models. Models are nested with an expanded array of other variables held constant at each stage. Detailed results are in the Technical Notes.

Model 1 (Deep background): Individual contract attitudes = f(Age, Male, Father's occupational status, Parent's education, Parent's Political party, Number of siblings, Grew up in an urban area).

Model 2 (Recent background): Model 1 + Urban resident currently, Married, Education.

Model 3 (Job characteristics): Model 2 + Labor force experience, Employer, Government employee, Employee of non-profit company, firm size, Assessment of firm's human relations management, Risk of downsizing, Job security, Supervisory role, Job complexity, Job autonomy, Occupational status, Blue-collar, Hours worked, Experience in job.

Model 4 (Earnings): Model 3 + earnings.

Model 5 (Legitimate reward): Model 4 + Effort legitimates reward, Family needs legitimate reward, Comparisons with others legitimate reward.

Model 6 (Perceptions): Model 5 + Perceived capability of poor, Perceived necessity of profit.

Model 7 (Unions & trust): Model 6 + Pro-union attitudes, Trust in business, Trust in government economic advice.

Taking income into account does not erode the effect of non-profit-sector employment on attitudes towards individual bargaining (Model 4, Table 8), so it is not the relatively low pay experienced by people in the sector that stimulates their opposition to individual bargaining. Instead, the opposition is a matter of culture or ideology. When values about the legitimate bases of reward are taken into account, the effects of non-profit-sector employment become insignificant (Model 5). This means that employment in the non-profit sector has no direct impact on attitudes towards individual bargaining, rather such employment is associated with views that it is not especially desirable to reward individual effort at work, and those views, in turn, foster opposition to individual bargaining (Model 6, Technical Notes).

Because individual bargaining, implies fairly fundamental workplace reform, we also investigated the effects wide range of other job and workplace-related characteristics, none of which were statistically significant. Some of these "non-effects" are quite important, because they suggest that the issue of support for individual bargaining is more complex than it appears at first glance.

- In particular, the fact that there is no statistically significant effect of **supervisory responsibilities** or of **business ownership** is quite striking (Model 3, Technical Notes). Systematically tracing the sources of the less-than-anticipated enthusiasm for individual bargaining is beyond

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the scope of this report, but future research might want to investigate the possibility that some supervisors and business owners concerns about the impact of individual bargaining on workplace harmony and team bonding may play some role.

- **Firm size** has no effect on attitudes towards individual bargaining. This undermines the hypothesis that workers in large organisations would feel daunted by the prospect of individual bargaining.
- There are three important indications that it is not only potential “losers” who have reservations about individual bargaining (Table 4). First, **job complexity** has no effect, which means that people working at the most tasks are no keener on individual bargaining than people doing the simplest, most routine kinds of work, other things equal. Second, **occupational status**, a summary measure of job quality, has no effect. Since individual bargaining would very likely increase rewards to top occupations, the null effect of occupational status is another indication that opposition to individual bargaining is not restricted to discontent on the part of people who would be likely to lose from it. Third, **job security** does not significantly affects people’s attitudes towards individual bargaining. While we know from other research that job security enhances job commitment and employee morale, having a secure job does not seem to make employees feel more confident in the general desirability of individual bargaining.
- Other workplace-related variables that had no effect include: **labour force experience**, **firm-specific experience**, **hours worked**, perceived risk that one’s firm will be **downsizing** next year (Table 4).
- Importantly, **earnings** has no effect on views about individual contracts (Table 4). The well-paid presumably stand to gain more from individual employment contracts, but this does not persuade them that such contracts are a good idea.

In sum, there are a number of moderately important effects of one’s job and workplace on one’s attitudes towards individual bargaining, but there are also a range of work-related characteristics that do not matter at all. Indeed, these variables, together with the current and deep background factors explored earlier, account for 15 per cent of the variance in attitudes towards individual bargaining. That is not trivial, but it means that most of the influences on attitudes towards individual bargaining lie elsewhere, very likely outside the workplace. We suspect that few other important “objective” sources of attitudes towards individual bargaining exist, and that the conflict over individual bargaining is largely a conflict of ideas – conflicting values, conflicting perceptions, trust and mistrust.

One noteworthy conclusion that we can draw from the results thus far is that self-interest seems to play little role in approval or disapproval of individual employment contracts.

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## Effects of Values Concerning the Legitimate Bases of Reward

A recurrent controversy in designs of and debate over of pay systems, is on what basis should rewards be allocated. Over the years, we have examined a wide variety of possible legitimate considerations, and narrowed them down to a those that are actually socially important. By that, we mean ideals that are held by a reasonably large number of people and that influence other attitudes, values, or behaviours.

In terms of support for and opposition to individual contracts, the most important of these legitimate bases of reward is **diligence as a legitimate basis of pay inequality** (Model 5, Table 9). People who think that individual effort should be an important determinant of pay are more inclined to support individual contracts than are people who think it is wrong to differentiate pay according to diligence. Indeed, in the extremes, the difference between some who thinks individual effort should be the most important determinant of pay and some who thinks it should not matter at all is 21 points out of 100 (metric regression coefficient, Model 5, Technical Notes), but in practice the typically observed range will be smaller, because very few people strongly reject rewarding effort with pay. Rather the difference is between people who think it should matter somewhat and people who think it should matter a lot. The patterns are similar in the non-working population (Table 9, below, and Models 7 and 14, Technical Notes).

Table 9. Legitimacy of effort as a source of pay: Standardised regression coefficients of the legitimacy of effort as a source of pay inequality. Nested models predicting attitudes towards individual bargaining, from models estimated separately for the working population and for non-working people, Australia 1999/2000.

Causal variable: Legitimacy of effort as source of pay	Model 1: Deep background	Model 2: (1) + Recent background	Model 3: (2) + Job characteristics	Model 4: (3) + Earnings	Model 5: (4) + Legit- imate reward	Model 6: (5) + Perceptions	Model 7: (6) + Unions + Trust
Population analyzed: Working people	--	--	--	--	0.108	ns	ns
Not working	--	--	--	--	0.130	ns	ns

Source: International Social Science Survey/ Australia, 1999/2000.

Notes:

Model 3 adds in current work characteristics, so it is not estimated for non-working people.

Dependent variable: 5-point agree/disagree scale of answers on the statement "Employers should have the right to negotiate earnings with each individual worker."

Contents: Standardised regression coefficients from multivariate models. Models are nested with an expanded array of other variables held constant at each stage. Detailed results are in the Technical Notes.

Model 1 (Deep background): Individual contract attitudes = f(Age, Male, Father's occupational status, Parent's education, Parent's Political party, Number of siblings, Grew up in an urban area).

Model 2 (Recent background): Model 1 + Urban resident currently, Married, Education.

Model 3 (Job characteristics): Model 2 + Labor force experience, Employer, Government employee, Employee of non-profit company, firm size, Assessment of firm's human relations management, Risk of downsizing, Job security, Supervisory role, Job complexity, Job autonomy, Occupational status, Blue-collar, Hours worked, Experience in job.

Model 4 (Earnings): Model 3 + earnings.

Model 5 (Legitimate reward): Model 4 + Effort legitimates reward, Family needs legitimate reward, Comparisons with others legitimate reward.

Model 6 (Perceptions): Model 5 + Perceived capability of poor, Perceived necessity of profit.

Model 7 (Unions & trust): Model 6 + Pro-union attitudes, Trust in business, Trust in government economic advice.

In both the working and non-working populations, the influences of endorsing or rejecting **effort as a legitimate basis of pay inequality** on attitudes towards individual contracts are all indirect through perceptions of the economic capabilities of the poor and through perceptions of the degree to which business profits are re-invested and so fuel economic growth (Models 6 and 14 in the Technical Notes). This suggests that only people who think that all Australians are capable of due diligence at work feel that such diligence should be rewarded.

Other potential legitimate bases of reward that we included in the model had no effect (Models 6 and Model 14, Technical Notes):

- We had included measures of the **legitimacy taking family responsibilities into account in pay setting** because it seem plausible that the (relatively few) people who think that pay ought to be differentiated according to family responsibilities would therefore be opposed to individual contracts. But in fact the effect is not statistically significant.
- We also included **comparative wage justice** ideals (that people doing the same sort of work ought to receive the same pay regardless of the

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location, industry, etc – a view that was very influential in some strands of the union movement) on the grounds that these ideals would lead their adherents to oppose individual contracts. But here, too, the effect is not significant.

- In exploratory analysis, we had also touched on the legitimacy of differentiating **pay according to the complexity of work** and the legitimacy of differentiating **pay according to supervisory responsibilities**, but there was so little association between these values and attitudes towards individual contracts that they were dropped at the exploratory stage.

### **Effects of Perceptions of the Economic Capabilities of the Poor**

Policy preferences often have to do with perceptions of the capabilities and likely behaviour of the major players, as well as with values about what is good or legitimate in itself. Accordingly, we included several measures of perceptions. Let us begin with perceptions of the economic capabilities of the poor.

People hold a wide range of perceptions of the economic capabilities of the poor, which seemed likely to affect attitudes towards individual bargaining essentially through views on fairness. More specifically, it seemed likely that people who see the poor as capable would therefore be inclined to think that they are autonomous adults who are potentially economically self-reliant and hence able to look after their own interests. If so, then individual bargaining would be a “fair game”, and, hence morally acceptable. From the opposite side, it seemed likely that people who see the poor as inept or damaged would tend to feel that individual bargaining would be inherently unfair because the poor could not properly stand up for themselves in individual bargaining and employers would take advantage of the incapacity of the poor.

In fact, **perceptions of the economic capabilities of the poor** have a large and important impact on attitudes towards individual bargaining. The standardised regression coefficient is a large 0.197 for the working population, and the effect in the non-working population is similarly important (Model 6, Table 10). That is on a par with the most important effect discovered thus far, the effect of working in a manual or non-manual occupation (standardised regression coefficient of -0.190. In magnitude terms, working Australians who are strongly confident in the capabilities of the poor are 29 points out of 100 more positive towards individual contracts than are their peers who are convinced of the incapability of the poor (metric regression coefficient, Model 6, Technical Notes). The effect in the non-working population is very similar. Remember that this large effect is a net effect, not a raw effect; it comes from a multivariate analysis that adjusts for many other effects.

Table 10. Economic capabilities of the poor: Standardised regression coefficients of perceptions of the economic capabilities of the poor. Nested models predicting attitudes towards individual bargaining, from models estimated separately for the working population and for non-working people, Australia 1999/2000.

Causal variable: Economic capabilities of the poor	Model 1: Deep background	Model 2: (1) + Recent background	Model 3: (2) + Job characteristics	Model 4: (3) + Earnings	Model 5: (4) + Legit- imate reward	Model 6: (5) + Perceptions	Model 7: (6) + Unions + Trust
Population analyzed: Working people	--	--	--	--	--	0.197	0.119
Not working	--	--	--	--	--	0.215	0.109

Source: International Social Science Survey/ Australia, 1999/2000.

Notes:

Dependent variable: 5-point agree/disagree scale of answers on the statement "Employers should have the right to negotiate earnings with each individual worker."

Contents: Standardised regression coefficients from multivariate models. Models are nested with an expanded array of other variables held constant at each stage. Detailed results are in the Technical Notes.

Model 1 (Deep background): Individual contract attitudes = f(Age, Male, Father's occupational status, Parent's education, Parent's Political party, Number of siblings, Grew up in an urban area).

Model 2 (Recent background): Model 1 + Urban resident currently, Married, Education.

Model 3 (Job characteristics): Model 2 + Labor force experience, Employer, Government employee, Employee of non-profit company, firm size, Assessment of firm's human relations management, Risk of downsizing, Job security, Supervisory role, Job complexity, Job autonomy, Occupational status, Blue-collar, Hours worked, Experience in job.

Model 4 (Earnings): Model 3 + earnings.

Model 5 (Legitimate reward): Model 4 + Effort legitimates reward, Family needs legitimate reward, Comparisons with others legitimate reward.

Model 6 (Perceptions): Model 5 + Perceived capability of poor, Perceived necessity of profit.

Model 7 (Unions & trust): Model 6 + Pro-union attitudes, Trust in business, Trust in government economic advice.

The fact that there is such a large impact of perceptions of the economic capabilities of the poor makes clear that altruistic forces are very important in forming policy preferences in this domain. The poor are relatively few, but the life chances for these few weigh heavily in determining many Australians' policy preferences.

About half of the impact of these perceptions is, in turn, transmitted through trust in business and through support for trade unions (compare Model 6 to Model 7, and compare Model 15 to Model 16).

### Effects of Perceptions of Whether Monetary Incentives Fuel Economic Growth

We also included measures of **perceptions that monetary incentives fuel economic growth**, that profits are reinvested and bring future gains for all. The hypothesis is that people who think that differential monetary rewards bring a better future for all will feel more positive about individual bargaining. Empirically, these perceptions do indeed play an important role in attitudes towards individual contracts, as shown by the standardised regression coefficient of 0.22 in the working population, and the effect is similar or slightly larger in the non-working population (Model 6, Table 11). These effects are on a par with

the two largest effects on attitudes towards individual contracts discovered thus far, blue collar employment and perceptions of the capabilities of the poor.

Table 11. Incentives and economic growth: Standardised regression coefficients of perceptions whether monetary incentives fuel economic growth. Nested models predicting attitudes towards individual bargaining, from models estimated separately for the working population and for non-working people, Australia 1999/2000.

Causal variable: Incentives and economic growth	Model 1: Deep background	Model 2: (1) + Recent background	Model 3: (2) + Job characteristics	Model 4: (3) + Earnings	Model 5: (4) + Legit- imate reward	Model 6: (5) + Perceptions	Model 7: (6) + Unions + Trust
Population analyzed: Working people	--	--	--	--	--	0.224	0.161
Not working	--	--	--	--	--	0.267	0.172

Source: International Social Science Survey/ Australia, 1999/2000.

Notes:

Dependent variable: 5-point agree/disagree scale of answers on the statement "Employers should have the right to negotiate earnings with each individual worker."

Contents: Standardised regression coefficients from multivariate models. Models are nested with an expanded array of other variables held constant at each stage. Detailed results are in the Technical Notes.

Model 1 (Deep background): Individual contract attitudes = f(Age, Male, Father's occupational status, Parent's education, Parent's Political party, Number of siblings, Grew up in an urban area).

Model 2 (Recent background): Model 1 + Urban resident currently, Married, Education.

Model 3 (Job characteristics): Model 2 + Labor force experience, Employer, Government employee, Employee of non-profit company, firm size, Assessment of firm's human relations management, Risk of downsizing, Job security, Supervisory role, Job complexity, Job autonomy, Occupational status, Blue-collar, Hours worked, Experience in job.

Model 4 (Earnings): Model 3 + earnings.

Model 5 (Legitimate reward): Model 4 + Effort legitimates reward, Family needs legitimate reward, Comparisons with others legitimate reward.

Model 6 (Perceptions): Model 5 + Perceived capability of poor, Perceived necessity of profit.

Model 7 (Unions & trust): Model 6 + Pro-union attitudes, Trust in business, Trust in government economic advice.

This is a large effect, with a 35-point gap separating those who perceive profit as necessary to economic growth from those who think profit is not necessary to economic growth (Model 6, Technical Notes). The effect is, if anything, a bit larger in the non-working population. This means in part that the visible re-investment or squandering of profits may have wider repercussions for the political process.

Part of the power of this perception flows indirectly through trust in business and attitudes towards unions – its importance is reduced by about one third when these other influences are also taken into account.

### *Joint Impact of Both Perceptions*

Taken together, these perceptions are very important. Bringing them in raises the percentage of variance in attitudes towards individual bargaining explained by the model from 17% to 26% in the working population (compare Models 5

and 6, Technical Notes), with an even greater gain among non-working people (compare Models 14 and 15, Technical Notes).

Another important feature of these perceptions is that they help to explain how other effects work. Table 12 shows that of the 8 variables found to be significant in prior stages of the model, the effects of 4 of them are reduced or eliminated when the perceptions are taken into account. In substantive terms, these four variables – parents’ political party, quality of human resource management, job autonomy, and feeling that it is morally correct to differentiate pay by diligence – operate in whole or in part through these perceptions. Importantly, that suggests that people’s support for individual contracts will shift as these perceptions shift, even if there is no change in the deeper causes. But it is also worth remembering that unanticipated changes in the deeper causes are likely to have “knock-on” or indirect effects that operate by changing these perceptions.

Table 12. Variables whose significant effects are substantially reduced or eliminated when the model takes into account perceptions of the capabilities of the poor and perceptions of the degree to which businesses reinvest profits and thereby fuel economic growth. Nested models predicting attitudes towards individual bargaining, from models estimated separately for the working population and for non-working people, Australia 1999/2000.

Variable:	Working	Not working
Age	Unchanged	ns already
Parents’ political party preference	Eliminated	Unchanged
Education	ns already	Reduced
Blue collar	Unchanged	N/A
Quality of human resource management	Reduced	N/A
Job autonomy/ self-direction	Eliminated	N/A
Non-profit organisation, outside governmental core	ns already	N/A
Legitimacy of differentiating pay by diligence	Eliminated	Eliminated

Source: International Social Science Survey/ Australia, 1999/2000.

Notes:

Dependent variable: 5-point agree/disagree scale of answers on the statement “Employers should have the right to negotiate earnings with each individual worker.”

Contents: Standardised regression coefficients from multivariate models. Models are nested with an expanded array of other variables held constant at each stage. Detailed results are in the Technical Notes.

## Effects of Proximate Causes: Attitudes towards Trade Unions, Business, and Government

**Trade-Union Attitudes.** Traditionally in Australia, trade unions have stood between worker and employer. In particular, the unions have taken a key role in pay negotiations at local, industry, and national levels. That makes it natural to ask how large an impact attitudes towards trade unions have on support for individual bargaining. Trade union attitudes have been carefully studied for

decades in Australia; we use the highly reliable, multiple-item IsssA Trade-Union-Attitudes Index to measure them (details in the Technical Notes).

In fact, trade-union attitudes have a very important effect on support for individual-level bargaining, as shown by the standardised regression coefficient of -0.291 in the working population and -.340 among those not currently in work (Model 7, Table 13). These are, by a substantial margin, the most important effects in the model (compare other standardised coefficients, Model 7 Technical Notes). In the extremes, the unions' staunchest opponents would be about 46 points out of 100 more favourable to individual contracts than dyed-in-the-wool union supporters would be (metric regression coefficient, Model 7, Technical Notes).

Table 13. Trade union attitudes: Standardised regression coefficients of trade-union attitudes (supportive of trade unions scored high). Nested models predicting attitudes towards individual bargaining, from models estimated separately for the working population and for non-working people, Australia 1999/2000.

Causal variable: Manual vs non-manual work	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Population analyzed: Working people	--	--	--	--	--	--	-0.291
Not working	--	--	--	--	--	--	-0.340

Source: International Social Science Survey/ Australia, 1999/2000.

Notes:

Dependent variable: 5-point agree/disagree scale of answers on the statement "Employers should have the right to negotiate earnings with each individual worker."

Contents: Standardised regression coefficients from multivariate models. Models are nested with an expanded array of other variables held constant at each stage. Detailed results are in the Technical Notes.

Model 1 (Deep background): Individual contract attitudes = f(Age, Male, Father's occupational status, Parent's education, Parent's Political party, Number of siblings, Grew up in an urban area).

Model 2 (Recent background): Model 1 + Urban resident currently, Married, Education.

Model 3 (Job characteristics): Model 2 + Labor force experience, Employer, Government employee, Employee of non-profit company, firm size, Assessment of firm's human relations management, Risk of downsizing, Job security, Supervisory role, Job complexity, Job autonomy, Occupational status, Blue-collar, Hours worked, Experience in job.

Model 4 (Earnings): Model 3 + earnings.

Model 5 (Legitimate reward): Model 4 + Effort legitimates reward, Family needs legitimate reward, Comparisons with others legitimate reward.

Model 6 (Perceptions): Model 5 + Perceived capability of poor, Perceived necessity of profit.

Model 7 (Unions & trust): Model 6 + Pro-union attitudes, Trust in business, Trust in government economic advice.

Importantly, this effect of attitudes towards trade unions is independent of the respondent's working environment – the regression coefficient of trade union attitudes is a net effect from which the effects of work situation have been filtered by regression analysis. More concretely, the same large link between trade union attitudes and support for individual bargaining is found among people in blue and white collar jobs; among workers in well-managed and badly managed companies; among employees in autonomous and closely supervised jobs; among people working in non-profit organisations outside the governmental

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core, people working in the private sector, and people working in the government sector. Indeed, the link between attitudes towards trade unions and individual bargaining is, if anything, slightly larger in the non-working population than in the working population.

Let us note that we did not investigate the role of trade union membership per se in this analysis, because it is not clear a priori whether membership should influence attitudes on individual bargaining, or attitudes on individual bargaining should influence membership, or both influence each other. In short, there is a problem of causal order. That could be solved in future research on these data, using the panel component of the IcssA sample for 1995 and 1999.

**Trust in business.** Can business be trusted? Do competition and custom and the long-view channel the lust for profit so that companies treat their employees and customers fairly, or are companies always trying to take unfair advantage? We use a two-item index of trust in business (see Technical Notes) to capture these effects.

Trust in business has only a moderately important effect on working people's attitudes about individual contracts, as shown by the standardised regression coefficient of 0.088 (Model 7, Table 14). That is only about one third as important as trade-union attitudes (standardised regression coefficient of -0.291). By contrast, interestingly, trust in business has considerably greater impact on the attitudes of people who are not working (Model 7, Table 14). Moreover, the magnitude of the effect differs greatly between working people and non-working people. At the extremes, those who trust business deeply are 14 points out of 100 more favourable to individual contracts than are their peers who profoundly mistrust business among working people, but the gap is 32 points among non-working people (metric regression coefficients, Model 7 and Model 16, Technical Notes).

Table 14. Trust in business: Standardised regression coefficients of trust in business (trust scored high). Nested models predicting attitudes towards individual bargaining, from models estimated separately for the working population and for non-working people, Australia 1999/2000.

Causal variable: Trust in business	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Population analyzed:							
Working people	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.088
Not working	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.210

Source: International Social Science Survey/ Australia, 1999/2000.

Notes:

Dependent variable: 5-point agree/disagree scale of answers on the statement "Employers should have the right to negotiate earnings with each individual worker."

Contents: Standardised regression coefficients from multivariate models. Models are nested with an expanded array of other variables held constant at each stage. Detailed results are in the Technical Notes.

Model 1 (Deep background): Individual contract attitudes = f(Age, Male, Father's occupational status, Parent's education, Parent's Political party, Number of siblings, Grew up in an urban area).

Model 2 (Recent background): Model 1 + Urban resident currently, Married, Education.

Model 3 (Job characteristics): Model 2 + Labor force experience, Employer, Government employee, Employee of non-profit company, firm size, Assessment of firm's human relations management, Risk of downsizing, Job security, Supervisory role, Job complexity, Job autonomy, Occupational status, Blue-collar, Hours worked, Experience in job.

Model 4 (Earnings): Model 3 + earnings.

Model 5 (Legitimate reward): Model 4 + Effort legitimates reward, Family needs legitimate reward, Comparisons with others legitimate reward.

Model 6 (Perceptions): Model 5 + Perceived capability of poor, Perceived necessity of profit.

Model 7 (Unions & trust): Model 6 + Pro-union attitudes, Trust in business, Trust in government economic advice.

**Trustworthiness of government** in the economic realm failed to have a statistically significant effect. That may seem puzzling, as endorsing individual bargaining would seem likely to be an important step for people hoping to exclude untrustworthy governments from the bargaining process. But it is possible that the hairpin curves in industrial relations policy at both the state and national level have left people confused. More exploratory analysis on the citizenry's ideal role of government in the industrial relations arena is clearly warranted.

### *Joint Impact of Attitudes Towards Trade Unions and of Trust in Business*

Including attitudes towards trade union and trust in business substantially improves the fit of the model. The percentage of variance explained (R-squared) in attitudes towards individual contracts is thereby raised from 26% to 34% in the working population, 21% to 34% in the non-working population. Clearly, there is still more to learn about sources of attitudes towards individual contracts, but it is a respectable level of variance-explained, being, for example, similar to that achieved in standard wage equations.

The large increases in explained variance also reveal another important feature of these attitudes – that they are to a substantial degree new sources of attitudes towards individual bargaining, as well as being partly transmitter variables

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passing on indirect influences of other variables in the model. This is particularly true in the working population, where inclusion of these variables does not render insignificant any of the effects that were significant in the previous model. It is true that inclusion of trade union attitudes and trust in business does substantially reduce the effects of perceived economic capabilities of the poor and of perceptions that business reinvests profits thereby fuelling economic growth, but these effects remain significant and so are not entirely funnelled through union attitudes and trust in business. The situation in the non-working population is broadly similar, although union attitudes and trust in business have an even more substantial transmitter role there. Their inclusion in the model renders two variables insignificant (education and parents' party) in the non-working population which were already insignificant in the working population. But their other consequences for the model are very similar in the two groups.

### **Links of attitudes on individual bargaining to other major political goals and issues**

Much of Australian politics revolves around the issue of egalitarianism and redistribution – basically should the government equalise incomes. We included an excellent multiple-item scale of this in the exploratory analysis, and there is indeed a negative bivariate correlation with attitudes towards individual bargaining of  $-.31$  – egalitarians tend to oppose individual contracts. Similarly, support for the conservative political parties is correlated at  $.32$ , with strong supporters of the Coalition being considerably keener on individual bargaining. And support for extensive government ownership of economic enterprises is correlated at  $-.15$  with support for individual contracts. But multivariate analysis showed that none of these variables added any independent explanation to the model. Thus, the links of these attitudes to support for individual bargaining come about only because both are correlated with ideals concerning the legitimate bases of reward, with perceptions about the economic capabilities of the poor, with perceptions of the need for monetary incentives, with trust in business, and support for trade unions.

# TECHNICAL NOTES

## The Question

The Technical Notes to the Descriptive Report (A) of this project provide detailed information on the questionnaire items in the IsssA 1999/2000 concerning industrial relations. In particular, their frequency distributions, inter-item correlations and factor structure are given there. Here we repeat the question to refresh memories, and then proceed to discuss the multivariate analysis of sources of attitudes towards individual contracts. The individual bargaining item is “d” in the industrial-relations set, just below.

12. Some people think that economic issues should be settled in nationwide negotiations between government, trade unions and employers. Others think decisions are best made locally by those directly involved. Would you say that...

	AGREE?				
	Yes!!	Yes	??	No	No!!
a. Wages and salaries should be set nationally in negotiations between the federal government in Canberra, national trade union confederations like the ACTU, and nationwide employer groups like the Business Council of Australia?.....					
b. <b>All</b> important economic decisions should be made jointly by the federal government, nationwide trade union and nationwide employers' groups? .....	Yes!!	Yes	??	No	No!!
c. Wages should be negotiated in each individual company, rather than for the industry as a whole? .....	Yes!!	Yes	??	No	No!!
d. Employers should have the right to negotiate earnings with each individual worker? .....	Yes!! <sub>1</sub>	Yes <sub>2</sub>	?? <sub>3</sub>	No <sub>4</sub>	No!! <sub>5</sub>

## Missing Data

The percentages of respondents who did not answer the individual bargaining item are:

Attitudes towards individual contract	Sample	Missing	Valid	Total	% Missing
	All	134	1599	1733	7.73
	Working	36	696	732	4.92

Thus, there are missing data for 4.9% of working Australians and 7.7%, of all adults.

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## **Calibrating Attitudes Towards Individual Contracts**

We score the response categories to the industrial relations questions in equal intervals between zero and 100. Formally, the answer categories reflect an ordinal rather than a cardinal scoring. One could derive cardinal scorings using ordered probit regressions or polychoric correlations, but our experience is that this is little gain to the more elaborate procedures: on questionnaire items in kindred areas, we have found that predicted values from parallel analyses using equal interval scorings and scorings derived from ordered probit or ordered logistic regressions are correlated at over 0.99.

Thus, the choice between OLS and these other procedures involves, like many other things in life an assessment of risk and tradeoffs between avoiding one risk and other potential investments. By analogy, some people stock their basements with a year's supply of food against the possibility of a major meteor impact spoiling crops and inducing widespread famine, but most people judge the risk to be sufficiently remote that they prefer other uses for their resources. Similarly, in this case, it is more cost effective to proceed directly with the equal interval scoring.

## **Causal variables: Multiple item measurement to reduce random measurement error**

Random measurement error in the causal variables renders coefficient estimates biased and inconsistent, so it is important to reduce it by using well-designed multiple item indices (normally validated by a good factor structure). We give, below the verbatim wording of the items in our scales/indices. These scales have been developed using elaborate developmental procedures, and quantitatively validated. Each is unidimensional, measuring a specific concept. Where there are more than two items, the worth of each item has been demonstrated in factor analysis (items typically have loadings over 0.6), and the items have similar correlations with criterion variables.

## Scales/ Indices

### *Quality of human resource management*

HR Quality, the quality of human resources management in the organisation where respondent works, is measured by the IsssA's five item scale. Mnemonic in the tables below is HRManag\*. The items are:

How about **management** in your organisation, do they...

Reward employees who work hard? .....	Yes!!	Yes	??	No	No!!
Do they promote capable employees? .....	Yes!!	Yes	??	No	No!!
Do they respond to workers' suggestions? .....	Yes!!	Yes	??	No	No!!
Reward workers who do their job well?.....	Yes!!	Yes	??	No	No!!
Does management in your organisation reward loyal workers? .....	Yes!!	Yes	??	No	No!!

### *Job autonomy*

**Job autonomy**, the degree of self-direction R is accorded at work is measured by the IsssA's four-item scale. Mnemonic in tables below is JbAut\*. The items are:

And is this true of your job ...

**TRUE?**

I have a lot of freedom to decide <b>what</b> I do at work .....	Yes!!	Yes	??	No	No!!
I have a lot of freedom to decide <b>how</b> I do my own work .	Yes!!	Yes	??	No	No!!
It is basically my own responsibility to decide how my job gets done.....	Yes!!	Yes	??	No	No!!
I have a lot of say about what happens on my job.....	Yes!! <sub>1</sub>	Yes <sub>2</sub>	?? <sub>3</sub>	No <sub>4</sub>	No!! <sub>5</sub>

### *Job complexity*

**Job complexity**, the complexity of respondent's tasks on their job is measured by the IsssA's four-item scale whose mnemonic is "JbCmplx\*" in the tables below. The items are:.

3. Is this true of your job, or not ...

**TRUE?**

e. Does it require special talents and abilities that most people do not have? .....	Yes!!	Yes	??	No	No!!
f. Is your job complex and difficult? .....	Yes!!	Yes	??	No	No!!
h. Does it require a lot of thinking? .....	Yes!!	Yes	??	No	No!!
i. And does it require good sense and sound judgment? ..	Yes!!	Yes	??	No	No!!

*Job security*

**Job security** is measured by a multiple-item scale whose mnemonic is “JobSecr\*” in the tables below. The items are:

Is this true of your job, or not ...	<b>TRUE?</b>				
a. Is your job secure? .....	Yes!!	Yes	??	No	No!!

and, elsewhere in the questionnaire:

c. Is your future in this company secure? ..... Yes!!<sub>1</sub> Yes<sub>2</sub> ??<sub>3</sub> No<sub>4</sub> No!!<sub>5</sub>

Is your job **permanent** with some legal protection against being fired or made redundant?

- Legally permanent; difficult or impossible to lose my job ..... **1**
- Practically secure; hard to lose my job..... **2**
- Not secure; could be fired or made redundant at any time ..... **3**

*Supervision*

**Supervisory responsibilities** are measured by a scale combining information on whether R supervises, and if so (a) how many people R supervises and (b) whether any of the people R supervises in turn supervise others together with several other items measuring supervisory responsibilities:

Is this true of your job, or not ...	<b>TRUE?</b>				
k. Does your job require being good at supervising others? P41Q3K .....	Yes!!	Yes	??	No	No!!
l. Do you have to plan other people's work? P41Q3L.....	Yes!!	Yes	??	No	No!!
o. Do you bear a lot of responsibility? P41Q3O .....	Yes!!	Yes	??	No	No!!

**Legitimate bases of reward** are measured by:

In deciding how much people ought to earn, how important should each of these things be, in your opinion ...

Top	--	Essential
Very	--	Very important
Fairly	--	Fairly important
Not	--	Not very important
Not!!	--	Not important at all



**IDEAL IMPORTANCE IN DECIDING PAY?**

a. How energetic and diligent the worker is? .....	Top <sub>1</sub>	Very <sub>2</sub>	Fairly <sub>3</sub>	Not <sub>4</sub>	Not!! <sub>5</sub>
h. What workers in other industries get for similar work -- how important should that be?.....	Top <sub>1</sub>	Very <sub>2</sub>	Fairly <sub>3</sub>	Not <sub>4</sub>	Not!! <sub>5</sub>
i. What other workers in the firm get for the job? .....	Top <sub>1</sub>	Very <sub>2</sub>	Fairly <sub>3</sub>	Not <sub>4</sub>	Not!! <sub>5</sub>
j. What workers in that job get in New Zealand? .....	Top <sub>1</sub>	Very <sub>2</sub>	Fairly <sub>3</sub>	Not <sub>4</sub>	Not!! <sub>5</sub>
k. What workers in that job get in Western Europe? .	Top <sub>1</sub>	Very <sub>2</sub>	Fairly <sub>3</sub>	Not <sub>4</sub>	Not!! <sub>5</sub>

*Perceptions: Economic Capabilities of the Poor*

We measure perceptions of the economic capabilities of the poor by a 3-item scale the mnemonic of which is “Poor\*Can” in the tables below. The items are:

Do you agree or disagree...

d. Poor people could improve their lot if they tried .....	Yes!!	Yes	??	No	No!!
e. People are poor because of lack of effort on their part.	Yes!!	Yes	??	No	No!!
f. Anyone can raise their standard of living if they are willing to work at it .....	Yes!!	Yes	??	No	No!!

*Perceptions: Monetary incentives fuel economic growth*

We measured people’s perceptions of the necessity of monetary incentives/ profit with a multiple-item scale. Mnemonic of index is “Fn\*Profit”.

“Some people say money is necessary for motivation -- that the prospect of higher pay leads people to work hard and take risks to get ahead. Others disagree. Would you say that ...”

a. Allowing business to make good profits is the best way to improve everyone's standard of living .....	Yes!! <sub>1</sub>	Yes <sub>2</sub>	?? <sub>3</sub>	No <sub>4</sub>	No!! <sub>5</sub>
b. For Australia's economy to grow, it is necessary to let energetic entrepreneurs earn a lot.....	Yes!! <sub>1</sub>	Yes <sub>2</sub>	?? <sub>3</sub>	No <sub>4</sub>	No!! <sub>5</sub>
c. For future prosperity, it is necessary to pay high salaries to those who do the best work .....	Yes!! <sub>1</sub>	Yes <sub>2</sub>	?? <sub>3</sub>	No <sub>4</sub>	No!! <sub>5</sub>
d. Inequality in income is necessary for economic progress .....	Yes!! <sub>1</sub>	Yes <sub>2</sub>	?? <sub>3</sub>	No <sub>4</sub>	No!! <sub>5</sub>

*Trust in business*

We measure trust in business with a three-item index whose mnemonic is TrustBz\* in the tables below.

“How much confidence do you have in...”

Yes!! -- Complete confidence Yes -- A great deal of confidence ?? -- Some confidence No -- Very little confidence No!! -- No confidence at all - (can't choose)
--

	<b>HAVE CONFIDENCE?</b>					
b. Business and industry? P2Q8B .....	Yes!!	Yes	??	No	No!!	--

And, asked elsewhere in the questionnaire:

“How much confidence do you have in ...”

1 -- A very great deal 2 -- A great deal 3 -- Some 4 -- Only a little 5 -- Hardly any 6 -- None at all
---

	<b>CONFIDENCE</b>					
	<b>Very great deal</b>			<b>None</b>		
c. Major Australian companies? .....	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>

and, elsewhere in the questionnaire,

“There are sometimes controversies about which policy is best for **Australia as a whole**. In deciding about economic policy, who would you believe ... “

d. Business leaders, like the Business Council of Australia -- believe what they say about economics? P52Q13D ..... Believe!! Believe ?? Not Not!!

*Attitudes towards trade unions*

**Trade-Union attitudes** are measured by a three-item index whose mnemonic is ProTU\*:

a. In general, how good a job would you say the trade unions are doing for the country as a whole?

Excellent<sub>1</sub>      Very good<sub>2</sub>      Fairly good<sub>3</sub>      Not very good<sub>4</sub>      No good at all<sub>5</sub>      Terrible<sub>6</sub>

b. When you hear of a strike, are your sympathies generally for or against the strikers?

Almost always for them<sub>1</sub>      Usually for them<sub>2</sub>      Half and half<sub>3</sub>      Usually against them<sub>4</sub>      Almost always against them<sub>5</sub>

c. Do you think that trade unions in this country have too much power or too little power?

Far too much power<sub>1</sub>      Too much power<sub>2</sub>      About the right amount<sub>3</sub>      Too little power<sub>4</sub>      Far too little power<sub>5</sub>

Details on the measurement of attitudes towards trade unions are available in :

1. Kelley, Jonathan, and M.D.R. Evans. 2000. "Changing Attitudes Towards Trade Unions in Australia: 1984-1999." *Australian Social Monitor* 3(1):1-5.
2. Kelley, Jonathan, and M.D.R. Evans. 2000. "Attitudes Towards Trade Unions: Sources of Support and Opposition in Australia." *Australian Social Monitor* 3(2):29-35.

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*Egalitarianism*

Egalitarianism is measured by a three-item index, signified in the tables below by the mnemonic RelIneq\*:

Do you agree or disagree...

h. There is too much of a difference between rich and poor in this country P53Q4H .....	<b>Yes!!</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>??</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>No!!</b>
i. Income and wealth should be redistributed toward ordinary working people P53Q4I .....	<b>Yes!!</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>??</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>No!!</b>
j. One of the most important aims in this country over the next ten years should be to reduce differences between rich and poor P53Q4J.....	<b>Yes!!<sub>1</sub></b>	<b>Yes<sub>2</sub></b>	<b>??<sub>3</sub></b>	<b>No<sub>4</sub></b>	<b>No!!<sub>5</sub></b>

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## Model Development

We began with an exploratory model, containing a wide range of potentially interesting variables that are known to be relevant to policy preferences in the general domains of employment relations and of social protection. This is the model we estimated for the whole population.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Support\_for\_individual\_contracts} = & b_0 + b_1\text{Age} + b_2\text{Sex} + b_3\text{Father\_Occupation} \\ & + b_4\text{Parents\_Education} + b_5\text{Parents\_Party} + b_6\text{How\_Many\_Siblings} \\ & + b_7\text{Education} + b_8\text{UrbanNow} + b_9\text{Married} + b_{10}\text{Political\_Party} \\ & + b_{11}\text{In\_Workforce} + b_{12}\text{Workforce\_Experience} \\ & + b_{13}\text{Profits\_Good\_For\_All} + b_{14}\text{Business\_Open\&Wise} \\ & + b_{15}\text{Unions\_Open\&Wise} + b_{16}\text{Gov\_Open\&Wise} \\ & + b_{17}\text{ConsumerGroups\_Open\&Wise} + b_{18}\text{Poor\_Capable} \\ & + b_{19}\text{Effort:Legitimate\_Basis\_of\_Reward} \\ & + b_{20}\text{Complexity:Legitimate\_Basis\_of\_Reward} \\ & + b_{21}\text{FamilyNeeds:Legitimate\_Basis\_of\_Reward} \\ & + b_{22}\text{What\_OthersGet:Legitimate\_Basis\_of\_Reward} \\ & + b_{23}\text{Ideal\_Returns\_to\_Education} \\ & + b_{24}\text{Government\_Economically\_Trustworthy} \\ & + b_{24}\text{Trust\_in\_Business} + b_{26}\text{Pro-Trade\_Union} \\ & + b_{27}\text{Egalitarian} + b_{28}\text{Favours\_Government\_Ownership\_of\_Enterprises} \\ & + b_{29}\text{Favours\_Government\_Price\_Fixing} \end{aligned}$$

We then evicted many candidate variables that did not have significant effects and focused on the reduced model including only the variables that do have significant effects, plus a few variables with non-significant effects where the absence of effect is important in understanding how attitudes towards individual contracts are formed (for example, in assessing the role of self-interest in forming attitudes towards individual contracts, it is important to know that earnings have no effect).

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The effects in the reduced model are mostly similar but not identical to the effects in the full model (basically because of correlations among the causal variables).

After developing the reduced model in the total population, we estimated it separately for the working and non-working populations. To the model for the working population we added a wide array of job and workplace characteristics.

We use regression analysis because the attitudes towards individual contracts have well-behaved, single-humped distributions, with substantial variances.

### **Model Estimation**

We estimated the model by ordinary least squares regression methods. These robust techniques are well-suited to the well-behaved, largely continuous variables in this exploratory analysis.

## Background statistics: means, standard deviations, and correlations of variables in the regression analysis

### *Means for labour force participants.*

Mnemonic	Mean	Std Deviat	Cases	Variable definition
YOUBRG	55.39	27.71	779	Individual contracts good? q12d
ENTBRG	53.26	24.57	775	Enterprise bargaining good? q12c
LOCBRG	54.27	23.32	781	Firm, individual negotiate pay
CORPTSM	58.35	22.49	780	Unions, bz & govt negotiate pay, econ po
AGE	44.38	12.25	803	Age, single years
MALE	0.51	0.50	815	Reference category is female
FASTAT	44.93	28.75	653	Fathers occup status (JK worldwide)
PNTEDUC	9.84	2.85	785	Parents education (average)
PNTPTYNM	51.13	41.66	822	Parents party, missing=50
NSIBS	2.58	1.88	737	Number of brothers and sisters
URBAN14	968782.27	1170175.14	793	Urban resident at age 14
URBANNOW	1118225.67	1194252.34	789	Urban resident now
MARR	0.73	0.45	808	Married or defacto
EDYRS	12.66	2.81	660	Years of education (made in SP1)
INLF	1.00	0.00	822	
LfExpX	0.41	0.85	822	Recent LF experience (since 1985)
Employer	0.08	0.27	822	
Govt	0.26	0.44	822	Govt employee vs other (& not working)
NonProfit	0.09	0.29	822	Non-profit employee vs other (& not wrk)
FirmSize	1807.42	3211.40	773	
HRManag*	45.40	23.07	781	Human resource managment is good
DownNext	40.46	26.27	773	
JobSecr*	0.67	0.23	817	job secure (not=ASM scale)
JbSuper*	0.63	0.21	796	Job: Supervise, responsibility
JbCmplx*	0.69	0.20	796	Job: Complex
JbAut*	68.45	22.99	796	Job: Autonomous
OccStat	0.55	0.28	546	Occupational status (JK worldwide)
BlueCol	0.21	0.41	546	
WrkHrs2	38.43	13.99	822	
PARTHRS	0.33	0.47	822	
JobTenur	11.54	9.96	737	
FAIR1PAY	70.93	31.99	810	
EARNINGS	44520.92	36205.76	765	Earnings (from job)
FMIN000L	4.00	0.68	778	ln Family Income, 000s, ln
FAMINC	67644.60	46498.05	778	Family Income
LGTEFFRT	72.54	14.03	821	Effort: Legit basis reward
LGTFAMILY	45.00	21.89	812	Family: Legit basis reward
LGTCMPAR	47.92	14.51	772	Comparison w others \$: Legit basis rewar
Fn*Profit	56.81	17.90	772	Functional: Hi \$ for bz, good wrks neces
Poor*Can	54.75	18.98	794	Poor competitant: can escape poverty wit
ProTU*	46.79	17.70	794	
TrustBz*	52.63	17.84	819	

EGovEco	50.77	20.79	775	
TUMEMBER	0.34	0.47	792	R: Trade union membership
UNIONREP	54.71	31.28	781	
PRICEFIX	54.82	18.04	794	Govt fix consumer prices (pro; scale)
OWN\$ECON	39.25	13.94	793	
RelIneq*	60.06	24.00	821	
RIGHTPTY	0.48	0.43	770	

*Means for persons out of the labour force*

	Mean	Std Deviat	Cases	Label
YOUBRG	58.10	26.29	664	Individual contracts good? q12d
ENTBRG	56.82	24.98	664	Enterprise bargaining good? q12c
LOCBRG	57.47	23.52	666	Firm, individualate negotiate pay
CORPTSM	60.52	22.33	669	Unions, bz & govt negotiate pay, econ po
AGE	62.97	15.70	718	
MALE	0.44	0.50	715	
FASTAT	39.81	27.98	583	Fathers occup status (JK worldwide)
PNTEDUC	8.94	2.74	677	Parents education (average)
PNTPTYNM	45.47	40.99	728	Parents party, missing=50
NSIBS	2.85	2.15	601	
URBAN14	870122.50	1150109.65	683	Urban resident at age 14
URBANNOW	1065430.40	1194082.63	677	Urban resident now
MARR	0.76	0.43	719	Married or defacto
EDYRS	10.75	2.85	646	Years of education (made in SP1)
EARNINGS	4093.17	11653.66	644	Earnings (from job)
FMIN000L	3.13	0.84	613	ln Family Income, 000s, ln
FAMINC	33344.21	38336.94	613	Family Income
LGTEFFRT	73.65	13.36	723	Effort: Legit basis reward
LGTFAMILY	51.59	20.77	693	Family: Legit basis reward
LGTCMPAR	49.01	14.46	668	Comparison w others \$: Legit basis rewar
ProTU*	44.58	17.81	694	
TrustBz*	52.11	17.43	716	
EGovEco	52.77	20.12	660	
Fn*Profit	58.64	16.08	667	Functional: Hi \$ for bz, good wkrs neces
Poor*Can	55.67	17.76	691	Poor competitant: can escape poverty wit
TUMEMBER	0.04	0.20	689	R: Trade union membership
UNIONREP	54.25	31.35	683	
PRICEFIX	57.21	19.07	691	Govt fix consumer prices (pro; scale)
OWN\$ECON	40.62	14.29	693	
RelIneq*	64.96	22.21	723	
RIGHTPTY	0.53	0.45	653	

*Correlations for persons in the labour force*

x	YOUBRG	ENTBRG	LOCBRG	CORPTSM	AGE	MALE	FASTAT	PNTEDUC	PNTPTYNM
YOUBRG	1.000	0.592	0.906	-0.361	-0.109	-0.039	0.000	0.015	0.112
ENTBRG	0.592	1.000	0.878	-0.357	-0.054	0.035	-0.051	-0.008	0.071
LOCBRG	0.906	0.878	1.000	-0.403	-0.093	-0.002	-0.026	0.003	0.105
CORPTSM	-0.361	-0.357	-0.403	1.000	-0.027	-0.121	-0.008	0.011	-0.175
AGE	-0.109	-0.054	-0.093	-0.027	1.000	0.146	-0.155	-0.315	0.071
MALE	-0.039	0.035	-0.002	-0.121	0.146	1.000	-0.104	-0.054	0.006
FASTAT	0.000	-0.051	-0.026	-0.008	-0.155	-0.104	1.000	0.470	0.131
PNTEDUC	0.015	-0.008	0.003	0.011	-0.315	-0.054	0.470	1.000	0.134
PNTPTYNM	0.112	0.071	0.105	-0.175	0.071	0.006	0.131	0.134	1.000
NSIBS	-0.051	-0.017	-0.038	0.073	0.132	-0.009	-0.066	-0.094	-0.030
URBAN14	0.000	-0.024	-0.011	0.010	-0.110	0.046	0.169	0.150	-0.064
URBANNOW	0.032	0.009	0.024	0.045	-0.024	0.099	0.171	0.095	-0.022
MARR	-0.040	-0.010	-0.029	0.027	0.482	0.062	-0.104	-0.165	0.023
EDYRS	-0.017	-0.057	-0.042	-0.085	-0.120	-0.039	0.315	0.248	0.073
LfExpX	0.098	0.076	0.098	-0.025	-0.453	-0.092	0.083	0.140	-0.025
Employer	0.093	0.077	0.096	-0.100	0.145	0.019	-0.025	-0.081	0.077
Govt	-0.117	-0.073	-0.107	0.096	0.078	0.036	-0.013	-0.063	-0.059
NonProfit	-0.086	-0.106	-0.108	0.056	-0.014	-0.163	0.160	0.066	0.009
FirmSize	-0.062	-0.036	-0.057	0.028	-0.054	0.029	0.019	0.006	-0.007
HRManag*	0.247	0.215	0.258	-0.149	-0.051	0.025	0.030	0.037	0.062
DownNext	-0.117	-0.117	-0.132	0.025	0.152	0.063	-0.019	-0.026	-0.032
JobSecr*	0.147	0.131	0.156	-0.074	0.013	-0.103	0.039	0.049	0.062
JbSuper*	0.074	0.067	0.080	-0.038	0.106	0.048	0.015	-0.026	0.036
JbCmplx*	-0.002	0.013	0.007	-0.067	0.188	0.166	0.090	0.005	0.070
JbAut*	0.144	0.134	0.156	-0.112	0.245	0.039	0.062	-0.025	-0.001
OccStat	-0.011	-0.058	-0.039	-0.038	0.047	-0.051	0.212	0.116	0.021
BlueCol	-0.131	0.011	-0.073	0.095	-0.077	0.272	-0.116	-0.120	-0.060
WrkHrs2	0.054	0.071	0.070	-0.084	0.110	0.353	-0.117	-0.063	-0.002
PARTHRS	-0.016	-0.093	-0.061	0.021	-0.042	-0.309	0.061	0.050	0.048
JobTenur	-0.078	-0.020	-0.057	-0.020	0.461	0.178	-0.087	-0.161	0.058
FAIR1PAY	0.042	0.121	0.089	-0.073	0.019	0.002	0.055	0.075	-0.009
EARNINGS	0.046	0.091	0.075	-0.194	0.178	0.302	0.090	-0.051	0.019
FMIN00L	-0.008	0.017	0.003	-0.139	0.138	0.113	0.085	0.025	0.034
FAMINC	0.040	0.064	0.056	-0.199	0.048	0.108	0.115	0.040	0.062
LGTEFFRT	0.144	0.079	0.130	-0.040	-0.005	-0.075	-0.019	0.012	0.023
LGTFAMILY	-0.092	-0.096	-0.105	0.271	-0.026	-0.005	-0.087	-0.063	-0.045
LGTCMPAR	-0.113	-0.105	-0.122	0.258	0.014	-0.068	-0.040	-0.049	-0.075
Fn*Proft	0.343	0.278	0.350	-0.206	0.116	0.082	-0.023	-0.089	0.159
Poor*Can	0.321	0.292	0.345	-0.175	0.045	0.110	-0.039	-0.098	0.068
ProTU*	-0.430	-0.353	-0.442	0.388	-0.111	-0.042	0.019	0.042	-0.207
TrustBz*	0.294	0.206	0.283	-0.063	-0.077	-0.079	0.068	0.034	0.100
EGovEco	0.103	0.035	0.079	0.067	0.022	-0.014	0.017	0.015	0.013
TUMEMBER	-0.256	-0.146	-0.229	0.177	0.060	0.054	-0.034	-0.028	-0.087
UNIONREP	-0.477	-0.342	-0.464	0.373	-0.008	-0.004	-0.018	-0.012	-0.174
PRICEFIX	-0.217	-0.188	-0.228	0.384	-0.175	-0.122	-0.014	0.035	-0.146
OWNSECON	-0.154	-0.118	-0.156	0.357	-0.206	-0.242	-0.041	-0.025	-0.191

RelIneq*	-0.311	-0.228	-0.305	0.353	0.016	0.032	-0.070	-0.012	-0.191
RIGHTPTY	0.321	0.202	0.298	-0.268	0.106	-0.021	0.074	0.026	0.419
x	NSIBS	URBAN14	URBANNOW	MARR	EDYRS	LfExpX	Employer	Govt	NonProfit
YOUBRG	-0.051	0.000	0.032	-0.040	-0.017	0.098	0.093	-0.117	-0.086
ENTBRG	-0.017	-0.024	0.009	-0.010	-0.057	0.076	0.077	-0.073	-0.106
LOCBRG	-0.038	-0.011	0.024	-0.029	-0.042	0.098	0.096	-0.107	-0.108
CORPTSM	0.073	0.010	0.045	0.027	-0.085	-0.025	-0.100	0.096	0.056
AGE	0.132	-0.110	-0.024	0.482	-0.120	-0.453	0.145	0.078	-0.014
MALE	-0.009	0.046	0.099	0.062	-0.039	-0.092	0.019	0.036	-0.163
FASTAT	-0.066	0.169	0.171	-0.104	0.315	0.083	-0.025	-0.013	0.160
PNTEDUC	-0.094	0.150	0.095	-0.165	0.248	0.140	-0.081	-0.063	0.066
PNTPTYNM	-0.030	-0.064	-0.022	0.023	0.073	-0.025	0.077	-0.059	0.009
NSIBS	1.000	-0.092	-0.013	0.168	-0.166	-0.033	0.012	-0.005	-0.016
URBAN14	-0.092	1.000	0.498	-0.058	0.192	-0.028	-0.025	0.037	-0.013
URBANNOW	-0.013	0.498	1.000	-0.068	0.208	-0.015	-0.029	-0.041	-0.013
MARR	0.168	-0.058	-0.068	1.000	-0.119	-0.324	0.113	0.123	-0.079
EDYRS	-0.166	0.192	0.208	-0.119	1.000	-0.076	-0.019	0.131	0.142
LfExpX	-0.033	-0.028	-0.015	-0.324	-0.076	1.000	-0.075	-0.134	0.035
Employer	0.012	-0.025	-0.029	0.113	-0.019	-0.075	1.000	-0.178	-0.094
Govt	-0.005	0.037	-0.041	0.123	0.131	-0.134	-0.178	1.000	-0.188
NonProfit	-0.016	-0.013	-0.013	-0.079	0.142	0.035	-0.094	-0.188	1.000
FirmSize	-0.033	0.045	-0.014	0.008	0.051	-0.084	-0.150	0.306	-0.078
HRManag*	0.024	0.007	0.026	-0.020	0.029	0.058	0.222	-0.242	-0.078
DownNext	-0.011	-0.005	-0.098	0.080	0.022	-0.119	-0.010	0.245	0.000
JobSecr*	-0.030	0.016	0.016	-0.004	0.100	0.061	0.106	-0.071	0.052
JbSuper*	-0.028	0.008	0.023	0.116	0.237	-0.171	0.051	0.147	0.062
JbCmplx*	-0.053	0.033	0.052	0.124	0.364	-0.233	-0.008	0.211	0.079
JbAut*	-0.031	-0.008	0.039	0.126	0.163	-0.165	0.196	-0.023	0.043
OccStat	-0.069	0.198	0.215	-0.030	0.590	-0.126	-0.077	0.193	0.156
BlueCol	0.052	-0.115	-0.065	-0.101	-0.330	0.072	-0.011	-0.092	-0.130
WrkHrs2	0.010	-0.035	0.034	0.039	0.048	-0.181	0.055	-0.011	-0.049
PARTHRS	-0.017	-0.016	-0.053	0.035	-0.042	0.124	0.027	-0.099	0.050
JobTenur	0.027	-0.026	-0.038	0.213	-0.011	-0.233	0.192	0.190	-0.028
FAIRIPAY	0.027	0.039	-0.010	0.009	-0.020	0.003	-0.033	-0.008	-0.017
EARNINGS	-0.013	0.086	0.143	0.145	0.284	-0.229	0.059	0.108	-0.084
FMIN00L	-0.032	0.112	0.111	0.280	0.329	-0.240	-0.005	0.142	-0.010
FAMINC	-0.050	0.104	0.120	0.178	0.320	-0.119	0.018	0.088	-0.007
LGTEFFRT	-0.016	0.070	0.038	0.010	0.016	0.042	0.063	-0.154	-0.057
LGTFAMILY	0.082	-0.105	-0.070	-0.011	-0.160	0.053	-0.048	-0.073	-0.018
LGTCMPAR	0.021	-0.062	-0.026	-0.030	-0.045	0.010	-0.081	0.027	0.016
Fn*Proft	-0.027	-0.038	0.012	0.071	0.027	-0.024	0.125	-0.093	-0.083
Poor*Can	0.054	-0.050	0.003	0.044	-0.260	0.031	0.146	-0.128	-0.123
ProTU*	-0.046	0.011	0.018	-0.094	0.101	0.047	-0.194	0.161	0.091
TrustBz*	-0.057	0.023	-0.023	-0.045	-0.007	0.060	0.047	-0.073	-0.025
EGovEco	0.008	-0.015	0.007	0.036	-0.002	-0.037	0.011	0.020	-0.001
TUMEMBER	0.073	-0.026	-0.017	0.061	0.082	-0.117	-0.207	0.384	0.036
UNIONREP	0.010	-0.029	-0.034	0.013	0.068	-0.059	-0.183	0.238	0.062
PRICEFIX	0.042	0.017	0.017	-0.060	-0.076	0.042	-0.101	0.016	0.061
OWNSECON	-0.027	-0.089	-0.040	-0.099	-0.119	0.142	-0.080	-0.010	0.071
RelIneq*	-0.017	-0.013	-0.006	-0.049	-0.028	-0.001	-0.085	0.061	0.032
RIGHTPTY	0.000	-0.008	0.007	0.003	-0.015	0.029	0.128	-0.182	-0.040
x	FirmSize	HRManag*	DownNext	JobSecr*	JbSuper*	JbCmplx*	JbAut*	OccStat	BlueCol

YOUBRG	-0.062	0.247	-0.117	0.147	0.074	-0.002	0.144	-0.011	-0.131
ENTBRG	-0.036	0.215	-0.117	0.131	0.067	0.013	0.134	-0.058	0.011
LOCBRG	-0.057	0.258	-0.132	0.156	0.080	0.007	0.156	-0.039	-0.073
CORPTSM	0.028	-0.149	0.025	-0.074	-0.038	-0.067	-0.112	-0.038	0.095
AGE	-0.054	-0.051	0.152	0.013	0.106	0.188	0.245	0.047	-0.077
MALE	0.029	0.025	0.063	-0.103	0.048	0.166	0.039	-0.051	0.272
FASTAT	0.019	0.030	-0.019	0.039	0.015	0.090	0.062	0.212	-0.116
PNTEDUC	0.006	0.037	-0.026	0.049	-0.026	0.005	-0.025	0.116	-0.120
PNTPTYNM	-0.007	0.062	-0.032	0.062	0.036	0.070	-0.001	0.021	-0.060
NSIBS	-0.033	0.024	-0.011	-0.030	-0.028	-0.053	-0.031	-0.069	0.052
URBAN14	0.045	0.007	-0.005	0.016	0.008	0.033	-0.008	0.198	-0.115
URBANNOW	-0.014	0.026	-0.098	0.016	0.023	0.052	0.039	0.215	-0.065
MARR	0.008	-0.020	0.080	-0.004	0.116	0.124	0.126	-0.030	-0.101
EDYRS	0.051	0.029	0.022	0.100	0.237	0.364	0.163	0.590	-0.330
LfExpX	-0.084	0.058	-0.119	0.061	-0.171	-0.233	-0.165	-0.126	0.072
Employer	-0.150	0.222	-0.010	0.106	0.051	-0.008	0.196	-0.077	-0.011
Govt	0.306	-0.242	0.245	-0.071	0.147	0.211	-0.023	0.193	-0.092
NonProfit	-0.078	-0.078	0.000	0.052	0.062	0.079	0.043	0.156	-0.130
FirmSize	1.000	-0.121	0.072	-0.082	0.070	0.108	-0.128	0.084	-0.039
HRManag*	-0.121	1.000	-0.273	0.210	0.129	0.050	0.232	0.013	-0.094
DownNext	0.072	-0.273	1.000	-0.307	0.000	0.050	-0.054	0.015	0.046
JobSecr*	-0.082	0.210	-0.307	1.000	0.181	0.125	0.299	0.123	-0.148
JbSuper*	0.070	0.129	0.000	0.181	1.000	0.585	0.356	0.261	-0.095
JbCmplx*	0.108	0.050	0.050	0.125	0.585	1.000	0.326	0.367	-0.169
JbAut*	-0.128	0.232	-0.054	0.299	0.356	0.326	1.000	0.182	-0.123
OccStat	0.084	0.013	0.015	0.123	0.261	0.367	0.182	1.000	-0.530
BlueCol	-0.039	-0.094	0.046	-0.148	-0.095	-0.169	-0.123	-0.530	1.000
WrkHrs2	0.039	0.132	0.02	0.023	0.303	0.292	0.177	0.085	0.046
PARTHRS	-0.106	-0.079	-0.026	-0.016	-0.237	-0.236	-0.131	-0.129	-0.033
JobTenur	0.13	-0.06	0.221	0.057	0.21	0.244	0.146	0.099	-0.081
FAIR1PAY	0.018	0.235	-0.065	0.023	-0.156	-0.127	0.005	0.012	-0.051
EARNINGS	0.095	0.143	0.022	0.023	0.277	0.325	0.183	0.275	-0.125
FMIN000L	0.151	0.046	-0.041	0.076	0.259	0.284	0.172	0.341	-0.194
FAMINC	0.122	0.094	-0.052	0.076	0.229	0.241	0.141	0.316	-0.179
LGTEFFRT	-0.081	0.105	-0.099	0.097	0.109	0.038	0.074	-0.019	-0.049
LGTFAMILY	-0.063	0.011	-0.049	-0.024	-0.021	-0.054	-0.11	-0.171	0.147
LGTCMPAR	0.031	-0.048	0.035	-0.095	0.05	-0.013	-0.017	-0.02	0.091
Fn*Profit	-0.081	0.201	-0.106	0.119	0.122	0.08	0.191	0.012	-0.016
Poor*Can	-0.041	0.121	-0.122	0.108	0.037	-0.059	0.113	-0.16	0.071
ProTU*	0.093	-0.18	0.068	-0.136	-0.094	-0.022	-0.165	0.096	0.054
TrustBz*	0.017	0.106	-0.121	0.146	0.064	0.036	0.078	0.006	-0.081
EGovEco	-0.04	0.075	-0.081	0.089	0.028	0.03	0.045	-0.007	-0.076
TUMEMBER	0.279	-0.273	0.208	-0.043	0.125	0.125	-0.132	0.135	0.032
UNIONREP	0.124	-0.28	0.118	-0.173	-0.069	-0.002	-0.192	0.067	0.026
PRICEFIX	0.023	-0.15	-0.043	-0.097	-0.058	-0.114	-0.129	-0.058	0.136
OWNSECON	0.005	-0.143	-0.069	-0.065	-0.135	-0.224	-0.188	-0.109	0.142
RelIneq*	0.021	-0.188	0.067	-0.067	-0.047	0.004	-0.095	-0.054	0.119
RIGHTPTY	-0.033	0.189	-0.01	0.107	0.037	0.036	0.069	-0.011	-0.119
x	WrkHrs2	PARTHRS	JobTenur	FAIR1PAY	EARNINGS	FMIN000L	FAMINC	LGTEFFRT	LGTFAMILY
YOUBRG	0.054	-0.016	-0.078	0.042	0.046	-0.008	0.04	0.144	-0.092
ENTBRG	0.071	-0.093	-0.02	0.121	0.091	0.017	0.064	0.079	-0.096
LOCBRG	0.07	-0.061	-0.057	0.089	0.075	0.003	0.056	0.13	-0.105

CORPTSM	-0.084	0.021	-0.02	-0.073	-0.194	-0.139	-0.199	-0.04	0.271
AGE	0.11	-0.042	0.461	0.019	0.178	0.138	0.048	-0.005	-0.026
MALE	0.353	-0.309	0.178	0.002	0.302	0.113	0.108	-0.075	-0.005
FASTAT	-0.117	0.061	-0.087	0.055	0.09	0.085	0.115	-0.019	-0.087
PNTEDUC	-0.063	0.05	-0.161	0.075	-0.051	0.025	0.04	0.012	-0.063
PNTPTYNM	-0.002	0.048	0.058	-0.009	0.019	0.034	0.062	0.023	-0.045
NSIBS	0.01	-0.017	0.027	0.027	-0.013	-0.032	-0.05	-0.016	0.082
URBAN14	-0.035	-0.016	-0.026	0.039	0.086	0.112	0.104	0.07	-0.105
URBANNOW	0.034	-0.053	-0.038	-0.01	0.143	0.111	0.12	0.038	-0.07
MARR	0.039	0.035	0.213	0.009	0.145	0.28	0.178	0.01	-0.011
EDYRS	0.048	-0.042	-0.011	-0.02	0.284	0.329	0.32	0.016	-0.16
LfExpX	-0.181	0.124	-0.233	0.003	-0.229	-0.24	-0.119	0.042	0.053
Employer	0.055	0.027	0.192	-0.033	0.059	-0.005	0.018	0.063	-0.048
Govt	-0.011	-0.099	0.19	-0.008	0.108	0.142	0.088	-0.154	-0.073
NonProfit	-0.049	0.05	-0.028	-0.017	-0.084	-0.01	-0.007	-0.057	-0.018
FirmSize	0.039	-0.106	0.13	0.018	0.095	0.151	0.122	-0.081	-0.063
HRManag*	0.132	-0.079	-0.06	0.235	0.143	0.046	0.094	0.105	0.011
DownNext	0.02	-0.026	0.221	-0.065	0.022	-0.041	-0.052	-0.099	-0.049
JobSecr*	0.023	-0.016	0.057	0.023	0.023	0.076	0.076	0.097	-0.024
JbSuper*	0.303	-0.237	0.21	-0.156	0.277	0.259	0.229	0.109	-0.021
JbCmplx*	0.292	-0.236	0.244	-0.127	0.325	0.284	0.241	0.038	-0.054
JbAut*	0.177	-0.131	0.146	0.005	0.183	0.172	0.141	0.074	-0.11
OccStat	0.085	-0.129	0.099	0.012	0.275	0.341	0.316	-0.019	-0.171
BlueCol	0.046	-0.033	-0.081	-0.051	-0.125	-0.194	-0.179	-0.049	0.147
WrkHrs2	1	-0.711	0.17	-0.084	0.345	0.222	0.171	-0.007	-0.106
PARTHRS	-0.711	1	-0.182	0.003	-0.29	-0.203	-0.119	0.027	0.098
JobTenur	0.17	-0.182	1	-0.006	0.129	0.088	0.015	-0.029	-0.058
FAIR1PAY	-0.084	0.003	-0.006	1	0.117	0.103	0.081	-0.064	-0.04
EARNINGS	0.345	-0.29	0.129	0.117	1	0.611	0.704	-0.045	-0.174
FMIN00L	0.222	-0.203	0.088	0.103	0.611	1	0.886	-0.037	-0.227
FAMINC	0.171	-0.119	0.015	0.081	0.704	0.886	1	-0.026	-0.216
LGTEFFRT	-0.007	0.027	-0.029	-0.064	-0.045	-0.037	-0.026	1	0.181
LGTFAMILY	-0.106	0.098	-0.058	-0.04	-0.174	-0.227	-0.216	0.181	1
LGTCMPAR	-0.103	0.079	-0.029	-0.018	-0.089	-0.143	-0.122	0.09	0.306
Fn*Profit	0.115	-0.122	0.037	0.071	0.157	0.123	0.129	0.255	-0.121
Poor*Can	0.066	-0.023	0.048	0.033	0.005	0.011	0.006	0.172	-0.035
ProTU*	-0.077	0.005	-0.053	-0.042	-0.08	-0.044	-0.078	-0.122	0.186
TrustBz*	-0.049	0.027	-0.018	0.085	-0.03	0.015	0.007	0.073	-0.032
EGovEco	0.005	-0.013	0.001	0.083	-0.012	-0.008	-0.025	-0.025	0.01
TUMEMBER	0.019	-0.123	0.221	-0.023	0.054	0.122	0.032	-0.093	-0.007
UNIONREP	-0.084	0.009	0.022	-0.09	-0.108	-0.061	-0.135	-0.112	0.152
PRICEFIX	-0.109	0.077	-0.125	-0.134	-0.282	-0.193	-0.205	0.051	0.243
OWNSECON	-0.182	0.125	-0.076	-0.088	-0.331	-0.274	-0.274	-0.01	0.301
RelIneq*	-0.065	0.065	0.02	-0.148	-0.176	-0.174	-0.209	-0.065	0.303
RIGHTPTY	0.056	-0.022	0.054	0.087	0.074	0.046	0.09	0.09	-0.098
x	LGTCMPAR	Fn*Profit	Poor*Can	ProTU*	TrustBz*	EGovEco	TUMEMBER	UNIONREP	PRICEFIX
YOUBRG	-0.113	0.343	0.321	-0.43	0.294	0.103	-0.256	-0.477	-0.217
ENTBRG	-0.105	0.278	0.292	-0.353	0.206	0.035	-0.146	-0.342	-0.188
LOCBRG	-0.122	0.35	0.345	-0.442	0.283	0.079	-0.229	-0.464	-0.228
CORPTSM	0.258	-0.206	-0.175	0.388	-0.063	0.067	0.177	0.373	0.384
AGE	0.014	0.116	0.045	-0.111	-0.077	0.022	0.06	-0.008	-0.175
MALE	-0.068	0.082	0.11	-0.042	-0.079	-0.014	0.054	-0.004	-0.122

FASTAT	-0.04	-0.023	-0.039	0.019	0.068	0.017	-0.034	-0.018	-0.014
PNTEDUC	-0.049	-0.089	-0.098	0.042	0.034	0.015	-0.028	-0.012	0.035
PNTPTYNM	-0.075	0.159	0.068	-0.207	0.1	0.013	-0.087	-0.174	-0.146
NSIBS	0.021	-0.027	0.054	-0.046	-0.057	0.008	0.073	0.01	0.042
URBAN14	-0.062	-0.038	-0.05	0.011	0.023	-0.015	-0.026	-0.029	0.017
URBANNOW	-0.026	0.012	0.003	0.018	-0.023	0.007	-0.017	-0.034	0.017
MARR	-0.03	0.071	0.044	-0.094	-0.045	0.036	0.061	0.013	-0.06
EDYRS	-0.045	0.027	-0.26	0.101	-0.007	-0.002	0.082	0.068	-0.076
LfExpX	0.01	-0.024	0.031	0.047	0.06	-0.037	-0.117	-0.059	0.042
Employer	-0.081	0.125	0.146	-0.194	0.047	0.011	-0.207	-0.183	-0.101
Govt	0.027	-0.093	-0.128	0.161	-0.073	0.02	0.384	0.238	0.016
NonProfit	0.016	-0.083	-0.123	0.091	-0.025	-0.001	0.036	0.062	0.061
FirmSize	0.031	-0.081	-0.041	0.093	0.017	-0.04	0.279	0.124	0.023
HRManag*	-0.048	0.201	0.121	-0.18	0.106	0.075	-0.273	-0.28	-0.15
DownNext	0.035	-0.106	-0.122	0.068	-0.121	-0.081	0.208	0.118	-0.043
JobSecr*	-0.095	0.119	0.108	-0.136	0.146	0.089	-0.043	-0.173	-0.097
JbSuper*	0.05	0.122	0.037	-0.094	0.064	0.028	0.125	-0.069	-0.058
JbCmplx*	-0.013	0.08	-0.059	-0.022	0.036	0.03	0.125	-0.002	-0.114
JbAut*	-0.017	0.191	0.113	-0.165	0.078	0.045	-0.132	-0.192	-0.129
OccStat	-0.02	0.012	-0.16	0.096	0.006	-0.007	0.135	0.067	-0.058
BlueCol	0.091	-0.016	0.071	0.054	-0.081	-0.076	0.032	0.026	0.136
WrkHrs2	-0.103	0.115	0.066	-0.077	-0.049	0.005	0.019	-0.084	-0.109
PARTHRS	0.079	-0.122	-0.023	0.005	0.027	-0.013	-0.123	0.009	0.077
JobTenur	-0.029	0.037	0.048	-0.053	-0.018	0.001	0.221	0.022	-0.125
FAIR1PAY	-0.018	0.071	0.033	-0.042	0.085	0.083	-0.023	-0.09	-0.134
EARNINGS	-0.089	0.157	0.005	-0.08	-0.03	-0.012	0.054	-0.108	-0.282
FMIN00L	-0.143	0.123	0.011	-0.044	0.015	-0.008	0.122	-0.061	-0.193
FAMINC	-0.122	0.129	0.006	-0.078	0.007	-0.025	0.032	-0.135	-0.205
LGTEFFRT	0.09	0.255	0.172	-0.122	0.073	-0.025	-0.093	-0.112	0.051
LGTFAMILY	0.306	-0.121	-0.035	0.186	-0.032	0.01	-0.007	0.152	0.243
LGTCMPAR	1	0.027	-0.061	0.209	-0.007	0.164	0.059	0.156	0.177
Fn*Proft	0.027	1	0.362	-0.293	0.308	0.154	-0.141	-0.286	-0.283
Poor*Can	-0.061	0.362	1	-0.348	0.282	0.045	-0.175	-0.322	-0.177
ProTU*	0.209	-0.293	-0.348	1	-0.249	-0.017	0.306	0.695	0.237
TrustBz*	-0.007	0.308	0.282	-0.249	1	0.284	-0.141	-0.267	-0.162
EGovEco	0.164	0.154	0.045	-0.017	0.284	1	-0.044	-0.042	-0.059
TUMEMBER	0.059	-0.141	-0.175	0.306	-0.141	-0.044	1	0.45	0.065
UNIONREP	0.156	-0.286	-0.322	0.695	-0.267	-0.042	0.45	1	0.267
PRICEFIX	0.177	-0.283	-0.177	0.237	-0.162	-0.059	0.065	0.267	1
OWN\$ECON	0.196	-0.279	-0.139	0.231	-0.119	0.001	0.014	0.203	0.521
RelIneq*	0.204	-0.392	-0.275	0.362	-0.273	-0.078	0.151	0.311	0.314
RIGHTPTY	-0.144	0.255	0.242	-0.479	0.251	0.072	-0.197	-0.433	-0.236
x	OWN\$ECON	RelIneq*	RIGHTPTY						
YOUBRG	-0.154	-0.311	0.321						
ENTBRG	-0.118	-0.228	0.202						
LOCBRG	-0.156	-0.305	0.298						
CORPTSM	0.357	0.353	-0.268						
AGE	-0.206	0.016	0.106						
MALE	-0.242	0.032	-0.021						
FASTAT	-0.041	-0.07	0.074						
PNTEDUC	-0.025	-0.012	0.026						
PNTPTYNM	-0.191	-0.191	0.419						

NSIBS	-0.027	-0.017	0
URBAN14	-0.089	-0.013	-0.008
URBANNOW	-0.04	-0.006	0.007
MARR	-0.099	-0.049	0.003
EDYRS	-0.119	-0.028	-0.015
LfExpX	0.142	-0.001	0.029
Employer	-0.08	-0.085	0.128
Govt	-0.01	0.061	-0.182
NonProfit	0.071	0.032	-0.04
FirmSize	0.005	0.021	-0.033
HRManag*	-0.143	-0.188	0.189
DownNext	-0.069	0.067	-0.01
JobSecr*	-0.065	-0.067	0.107
JbSuper*	-0.135	-0.047	0.037
JbCmplx*	-0.224	0.004	0.036
JbAut*	-0.188	-0.095	0.069
OccStat	-0.109	-0.054	-0.011
BlueCol	0.142	0.119	-0.119
WrkHrs2	-0.182	-0.065	0.056
PARTHRS	0.125	0.065	-0.022
JobTenur	-0.076	0.02	0.054
FAIR1PAY	-0.088	-0.148	0.087
EARNINGS	-0.331	-0.176	0.074
FMIN000L	-0.274	-0.174	0.046
FAMINC	-0.274	-0.209	0.09
LGTEFFRT	-0.01	-0.065	0.09
LGTFAMILY	0.301	0.303	-0.098
LGTCMPAR	0.196	0.204	-0.144
Fn*Profit	-0.279	-0.392	0.255
Poor*Can	-0.139	-0.275	0.242
ProTU*	0.231	0.362	-0.479
TrustBz*	-0.119	-0.273	0.251
EGovEco	0.001	-0.078	0.072
TUMEMBER	0.014	0.151	-0.197
UNIONREP	0.203	0.311	-0.433
PRICEFIX	0.521	0.314	-0.236
OWN\$ECON 1		0.3	-0.21
RelIneq*	0.3	1	-0.364
RIGHTPTY	-0.21	-0.364	1

*Correlations for persons out of the labour force*

x	YOUBRG	ENTBRG	LOCBRG	CORPTSM	AGE	MALE	FASTAT	PNTEDUC	PNTPTYNM
YOUBRG	1.000	0.683	0.922	-0.310	-0.064	-0.048	0.074	0.046	0.181
ENTBRG	0.683	1.000	0.913	-0.331	0.036	-0.016	-0.008	0.001	0.153
LOCBRG	0.922	0.913	1.000	-0.348	-0.017	-0.037	0.038	0.025	0.182
CORPTSM	-0.310	-0.331	-0.348	1.000	0.039	-0.094	-0.118	-0.126	-0.196
AGE	-0.064	0.036	-0.017	0.039	1.000	0.257	-0.113	-0.266	-0.003
MALE	-0.048	-0.016	-0.037	-0.094	0.257	1.000	0.052	-0.036	0.013
FASTAT	0.074	-0.008	0.038	-0.118	-0.113	0.052	1.000	0.450	0.151
PNTEDUC	0.046	0.001	0.025	-0.126	-0.266	-0.036	0.450	1.000	0.216
PNTPTYNM	0.181	0.153	0.182	-0.196	-0.003	0.013	0.151	0.216	1.000
NSIBS	-0.008	0.001	-0.003	0.052	-0.016	-0.041	-0.114	-0.144	-0.088
URBAN14	0.011	-0.031	-0.009	-0.070	-0.063	0.092	0.293	0.171	0.033
URBANNOW	-0.013	-0.020	-0.017	-0.073	-0.029	0.051	0.170	0.056	-0.036
MARR	-0.033	-0.023	-0.031	-0.009	0.161	0.120	-0.106	-0.182	-0.024
EDYRS	-0.073	-0.037	-0.062	-0.195	-0.102	0.131	0.356	0.296	0.188
EARNINGS	0.008	-0.025	-0.004	-0.024	-0.177	-0.042	0.003	0.004	-0.007
FMIN000L	0.006	0.035	0.022	-0.150	-0.229	0.146	0.109	0.102	0.102
FAMINC	0.038	0.064	0.055	-0.148	-0.264	0.058	0.147	0.115	0.077
LGTEFFRT	0.128	0.147	0.150	-0.022	0.022	-0.066	0.033	0.032	0.044
LGTFAMILY	-0.053	-0.035	-0.046	0.222	0.098	-0.086	-0.143	-0.096	-0.078
LGTCMPAR	-0.051	-0.052	-0.053	0.253	-0.008	-0.063	-0.051	-0.020	-0.012
ProTU*	-0.454	-0.396	-0.464	0.451	-0.091	-0.044	-0.054	-0.032	-0.227
TrustBz*	0.338	0.295	0.344	-0.100	-0.026	0.066	0.015	0.019	0.094
EGovEco	0.067	0.048	0.060	0.085	0.018	0.111	0.030	0.117	-0.014
Fn*Proft	0.329	0.293	0.339	-0.193	0.102	0.220	0.001	0.025	0.143
Poor*Can	0.291	0.318	0.330	-0.114	0.061	0.146	-0.108	-0.070	0.028
TUMEMBER	-0.108	-0.058	-0.091	0.062	-0.051	0.050	-0.030	-0.012	-0.030
UNIONREP	-0.483	-0.425	-0.496	0.416	-0.048	0.102	-0.123	-0.102	-0.275
PRICEFIX	-0.248	-0.222	-0.257	0.350	-0.017	-0.173	-0.164	-0.066	-0.191
OWNSECON	-0.158	-0.169	-0.177	0.337	-0.089	-0.261	-0.114	-0.038	-0.162
RelIneq*	-0.270	-0.230	-0.273	0.347	0.022	-0.111	-0.156	-0.058	-0.125
RIGHTPTY	0.352	0.336	0.374	-0.355	0.102	0.053	0.133	0.089	0.354
x	NSIBS	URBAN14	URBANNOW	MARR	EDYRS	EARNINGS	FMIN000L	FAMINC	LGTEFFRT
YOUBRG	-0.008	0.011	-0.013	-0.033	-0.073	0.008	0.006	0.038	0.128
ENTBRG	0.001	-0.031	-0.020	-0.023	-0.037	-0.025	0.035	0.064	0.147
LOCBRG	-0.003	-0.009	-0.017	-0.031	-0.062	-0.004	0.022	0.055	0.150
CORPTSM	0.052	-0.070	-0.073	-0.009	-0.195	-0.024	-0.150	-0.148	-0.022
AGE	-0.016	-0.063	-0.029	0.161	-0.102	-0.177	-0.229	-0.264	0.022
MALE	-0.041	0.092	0.051	0.120	0.131	-0.042	0.146	0.058	-0.066
FASTAT	-0.114	0.293	0.170	-0.106	0.356	0.003	0.109	0.147	0.033
PNTEDUC	-0.144	0.171	0.056	-0.182	0.296	0.004	0.102	0.115	0.032
PNTPTYNM	-0.088	0.033	-0.036	-0.024	0.188	-0.007	0.102	0.077	0.044
NSIBS	1.000	-0.204	-0.131	0.024	-0.110	-0.093	-0.126	-0.094	-0.037
URBAN14	-0.204	1.000	0.445	-0.060	0.114	-0.071	0.104	0.125	0.046
URBANNOW	-0.131	0.445	1.000	-0.061	0.065	-0.036	0.099	0.101	0.076
MARR	0.024	-0.060	-0.061	1.000	0.065	0.056	0.204	0.050	-0.104
EDYRS	-0.110	0.114	0.065	0.065	1.000	0.006	0.247	0.209	-0.023
EARNINGS	-0.093	-0.071	-0.036	0.056	0.006	1.000	0.235	0.177	0.000
FMIN000L	-0.126	0.104	0.099	0.204	0.247	0.235	1.000	0.810	0.058
FAMINC	-0.094	0.125	0.101	0.050	0.209	0.177	0.810	1.000	0.066
LGTEFFRT	-0.037	0.046	0.076	-0.104	-0.023	0.000	0.058	0.066	1.000

LGTFAMILY	0.153	-0.093	-0.061	-0.078	-0.205	-0.010	-0.153	-0.102	0.121
LGTCMPAR	0.060	-0.042	0.010	-0.087	-0.139	-0.011	-0.084	-0.008	0.119
ProTU*	0.048	0.019	0.075	-0.038	0.018	-0.034	-0.085	-0.097	-0.149
TrustBz*	0.111	0.004	0.001	-0.003	-0.047	-0.025	0.045	0.018	-0.006
EGovEco	-0.038	0.076	0.043	-0.031	0.079	-0.013	0.047	0.061	0.019
Fn*Profit	0.027	0.016	-0.017	0.057	-0.002	0.002	0.045	0.065	0.165
Poor*Can	0.068	-0.024	-0.097	0.024	-0.145	0.005	-0.016	0.028	0.103
TUMEMBER	0.043	0.045	0.049	-0.024	0.039	0.006	0.051	0.067	-0.017
UNIONREP	0.045	0.008	0.056	-0.006	-0.029	0.010	0.017	-0.038	-0.091
PRICEFIX	0.140	-0.056	-0.055	-0.013	-0.146	-0.007	-0.213	-0.203	0.076
OWN\$ECON	0.119	-0.081	0.014	-0.096	-0.158	-0.014	-0.236	-0.201	0.010
RelIneq*	0.051	-0.110	-0.072	-0.066	-0.072	-0.002	-0.137	-0.147	-0.031
RIGHTPTY	-0.076	0.001	0.016	0.018	0.146	-0.009	0.136	0.131	0.096
x	LGTFAMILY	LGTCMPAR	ProTU*	TrustBz*	EGovEco	Fn*Profit	Poor*Can	TUMEMBER	UNIONREP
YOUBRG	-0.053	-0.051	-0.454	0.338	0.067	0.329	0.291	-0.108	-0.483
ENTBRG	-0.035	-0.052	-0.396	0.295	0.048	0.293	0.318	-0.058	-0.425
LOCBRG	-0.046	-0.053	-0.464	0.344	0.060	0.339	0.330	-0.091	-0.496
CORPTSM	0.222	0.253	0.451	-0.100	0.085	-0.193	-0.114	0.062	0.416
AGE	0.098	-0.008	-0.091	-0.026	0.018	0.102	0.061	-0.051	-0.048
MALE	-0.086	-0.063	-0.044	0.066	0.111	0.220	0.146	0.050	0.102
FASTAT	-0.143	-0.051	-0.054	0.015	0.030	0.001	-0.108	-0.030	-0.123
PNTEDUC	-0.096	-0.020	-0.032	0.019	0.117	0.025	-0.070	-0.012	-0.102
PNTPTYNM	-0.078	-0.012	-0.227	0.094	-0.014	0.143	0.028	-0.030	-0.275
NSIBS	0.153	0.060	0.048	0.111	-0.038	0.027	0.068	0.043	0.045
URBAN14	-0.093	-0.042	0.019	0.004	0.076	0.016	-0.024	0.045	0.008
URBANNOW	-0.061	0.010	0.075	0.001	0.043	-0.017	-0.097	0.049	0.056
MARR	-0.078	-0.087	-0.038	-0.003	-0.031	0.057	0.024	-0.024	-0.006
EDYRS	-0.205	-0.139	0.018	-0.047	0.079	-0.002	-0.145	0.039	-0.029
EARNINGS	-0.010	-0.011	-0.034	-0.025	-0.013	0.002	0.005	0.006	0.010
FMIN00L	-0.153	-0.084	-0.085	0.045	0.047	0.045	-0.016	0.051	0.017
FAMINC	-0.102	-0.008	-0.097	0.018	0.061	0.065	0.028	0.067	-0.038
LGTEFFRT	0.121	0.119	-0.149	-0.006	0.019	0.165	0.103	-0.017	-0.091
LGTFAMILY	1.000	0.302	0.126	-0.051	-0.083	-0.059	0.012	-0.017	0.103
LGTCMPAR	0.302	1.000	0.194	-0.037	0.025	0.003	-0.058	0.059	0.148
ProTU*	0.126	0.194	1.000	-0.173	-0.027	-0.247	-0.312	0.080	0.669
TrustBz*	-0.051	-0.037	-0.173	1.000	0.324	0.317	0.217	-0.031	-0.205
EGovEco	-0.083	0.025	-0.027	0.324	1.000	0.153	0.123	0.022	0.021
Fn*Profit	-0.059	0.003	-0.247	0.317	0.153	1.000	0.311	-0.035	-0.235
Poor*Can	0.012	-0.058	-0.312	0.217	0.123	0.311	1.000	0.012	-0.261
TUMEMBER	-0.017	0.059	0.080	-0.031	0.022	-0.035	0.012	1.000	0.117
UNIONREP	0.103	0.148	0.669	-0.205	0.021	-0.235	-0.261	0.117	1.000
PRICEFIX	0.229	0.201	0.259	-0.237	-0.024	-0.204	-0.087	0.071	0.274
OWN\$ECON	0.247	0.262	0.295	-0.216	-0.058	-0.298	-0.084	0.056	0.203
RelIneq*	0.297	0.213	0.323	-0.291	-0.109	-0.304	-0.236	0.070	0.322
RIGHTPTY	-0.154	-0.159	-0.567	0.217	0.075	0.226	0.193	-0.036	-0.530
x	PRICEFIX	OWN\$ECON	RelIneq*	RIGHTPTY					
YOUBRG	-0.248	-0.158	-0.270	0.352					
ENTBRG	-0.222	-0.169	-0.230	0.336					
LOCBRG	-0.257	-0.177	-0.273	0.374					
CORPTSM	0.350	0.337	0.347	-0.355					
AGE	-0.017	-0.089	0.022	0.102					
MALE	-0.173	-0.261	-0.111	0.053					

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FASTAT	-0.164	-0.114	-0.156	0.133
PNTEDUC	-0.066	-0.038	-0.058	0.089
PNTPTYNM	-0.191	-0.162	-0.125	0.354
NSIBS	0.140	0.119	0.051	-0.076
URBAN14	-0.056	-0.081	-0.110	0.001
URBANNOW	-0.055	0.014	-0.072	0.016
MARR	-0.013	-0.096	-0.066	0.018
EDYRS	-0.146	-0.158	-0.072	0.146
EARNINGS	-0.007	-0.014	-0.002	-0.009
FMIN00L	-0.213	-0.236	-0.137	0.136
FAMINC	-0.203	-0.201	-0.147	0.131
LGTEFFRT	0.076	0.010	-0.031	0.096
LGTFAMILY	0.229	0.247	0.297	-0.154
LGTCMPAR	0.201	0.262	0.213	-0.159
ProTU*	0.259	0.295	0.323	-0.567
TrustBz*	-0.237	-0.216	-0.291	0.217
EGovEco	-0.024	-0.058	-0.109	0.075
Fn*Profit	-0.204	-0.298	-0.304	0.226
Poor*Can	-0.087	-0.084	-0.236	0.193
TUMEMBER	0.071	0.056	0.070	-0.036
UNIONREP	0.274	0.203	0.322	-0.530
PRICEFIX	1.000	0.451	0.347	-0.300
OWN\$ECON	0.451	1.000	0.280	-0.262
RelIneq*	0.347	0.280	1.000	-0.325
RIGHTPTY	-0.300	-0.262	-0.325	1.000

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*Regression model 1: Individual bargaining: Deep background variables only, working population*

R Square .03010

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
AGE	-0.280	0.111	-0.124	-2.53	0.012
MALE	-1.472	2.560	-0.027	-0.58	0.566
FASTAT	-0.024	0.050	-0.025	-0.48	0.628
PNTEDUC	-0.332	0.526	-0.034	-0.63	0.528
PNTPTYNM	0.085	0.031	0.128	2.75	0.006
NSIBS	-0.525	0.680	-0.036	-0.77	0.440
URBAN14	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.05	0.961
(Constant)	69.898	7.895	0.000	8.85	0.000

*Regression model 2: Individual bargaining: Adding in more recent background variables, working population.*

R Square .03443

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
AGE	-0.312	0.124	-0.138	-2.51	0.012
MALE	-1.785	2.575	-0.032	-0.69	0.489
FASTAT	-0.021	0.052	-0.022	-0.40	0.688
PNTEDUC	-0.284	0.528	-0.029	-0.54	0.591
PNTPTYNM	0.086	0.031	0.130	2.79	0.006
NSIBS	-0.675	0.693	-0.046	-0.98	0.330
URBAN14	0.000	0.000	-0.023	-0.42	0.673
URBANNOW	0.000	0.000	0.063	1.17	0.243
MARR	1.493	3.261	0.024	0.46	0.647
EDYRS	-0.428	0.489	-0.043	-0.88	0.382
(Constant)	74.427	9.563	0.000	7.78	0.000

*Model 3: Individual bargaining: adding in variables describing the job and work organisation*

R Square .14854

Model 3					
Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
AGE	-0.30331	0.141853	-0.13407	-2.138	0.033
MALE	0.09274	2.828872	0.001674	0.033	0.9739
FASTAT	-0.00213	0.050373	-0.00221	-0.042	0.9663
PNTEDUC	-0.53153	0.510306	-0.05465	-1.042	0.2982
PNTPTYNM	0.073877	0.029929	0.111059	2.468	0.0139
NSIBS	-0.59186	0.664117	-0.04005	-0.891	0.3733
URBAN14	-4.41E-07	1.22E-06	-0.01862	-0.36	0.7189
URBANNOW	1.15E-06	1.21E-06	0.049615	0.953	0.3409
MARR	-0.14018	3.222887	-0.00225	-0.043	0.9653
EDYRS	-0.74155	0.5846	-0.07517	-1.268	0.2053
LfExpX	1.722534	1.677268	0.052711	1.027	0.305
Employer	1.935825	4.85431	0.019127	0.399	0.6902
Govt	-3.64225	3.270843	-0.05798	-1.114	0.2661
NonProfit	-9.57341	4.579404	-0.09895	-2.091	0.0371
FirmSize	-8.49E-05	4.07E-04	-0.00985	-0.209	0.8348
HRManag*	0.167567	0.059317	0.139538	2.825	0.0049
DownNext	0.017586	0.052218	0.016672	0.337	0.7364
JobSecr*	7.146263	5.902193	0.059608	1.211	0.2266
JbSuper*	8.540295	7.612911	0.064069	1.122	0.2625
JbCmplx*	-3.45228	8.523071	-0.02434	-0.405	0.6856
JbAut*	0.140298	0.062692	0.116414	2.238	0.0257
OccStat	-6.63797	6.268204	-0.06722	-1.059	0.2902
BlueCol	-12.9243	3.785554	-0.19036	-3.414	0.0007
WrkHrs2	0.079277	0.099605	0.040033	0.796	0.4265
JobTenur	-0.13967	0.148466	-0.0502	-0.941	0.3473
(Constant)	60.89808	11.92452	0	5.107	0

*Model 4: adds earnings (They are ns)*

R Square	.14946		R Square	.14946	
Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
AGE	-0.30986	0.142238	-0.13696	-2.178	0.0299
MALE	-0.37312	2.907258	-0.00673	-0.128	0.8979
FASTAT	-0.00667	0.050815	-0.00692	-0.131	0.8956
PNTEDUC	-0.49271	0.51358	-0.05066	-0.959	0.3379
PNTPTYNM	0.074321	0.029952	0.111727	2.481	0.0135
NSIBS	-0.59417	0.664498	-0.04021	-0.894	0.3717
URBAN14	-4.41E-07	1.23E-06	-0.01863	-0.36	0.7189
URBANNOW	1.11E-06	1.21E-06	0.047998	0.921	0.3576
MARR	-0.30067	3.232793	-0.00483	-0.093	0.9259
EDYRS	-0.80895	0.592759	-0.08201	-1.365	0.173
LfExpX	1.805239	1.682341	0.055242	1.073	0.2838
Employer	1.871546	4.857895	0.018492	0.385	0.7002
Govt	-3.66707	3.272868	-0.05837	-1.12	0.2631
NonProfit	-9.28391	4.600503	-0.09595	-2.018	0.0442
FirmSize	-1.04E-04	4.08E-04	-0.01208	-0.255	0.7986
HRManag*	0.163167	0.059681	0.135874	2.734	0.0065
DownNext	0.017332	0.052248	0.016432	0.332	0.7403
JobSecr*	7.220685	5.906454	0.060229	1.223	0.2222
JbSuper*	8.093308	7.643762	0.060716	1.059	0.2903
JbCmplx*	-3.63996	8.532042	-0.02566	-0.427	0.6699
JbAut*	0.14057	0.062729	0.11664	2.241	0.0255
OccStat	-6.89975	6.282802	-0.06987	-1.098	0.2727
BlueCol	-12.753	3.79553	-0.18784	-3.36	0.0008
WrkHrs2	0.065226	0.101652	0.032938	0.642	0.5214
JobTenur	-0.1334	0.148817	-0.04795	-0.896	0.3705
EARNINGS	2.85E-05	4.06E-05	0.037248	0.702	0.4832
(Constant)	62.09051	12.05158	0	5.152	0

*Model 5: Adds legitimate bases of reward, only legitimacy of effort matters*

R Square .16903

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
AGE	-0.30825	0.141317	-0.13625	-2.181	0.0297
MALE	-0.00693	2.895996	-1.25E-04	-0.002	0.9981
FASTAT	-0.0064	0.050423	-0.00664	-0.127	0.8991
PNTEDUC	-0.52014	0.509491	-0.05348	-1.021	0.3079
PNTPTYNM	0.068727	0.029776	0.103317	2.308	0.0214
NSIBS	-0.50344	0.66022	-0.03407	-0.763	0.4461
URBAN14	-8.94E-07	1.22E-06	-0.03775	-0.731	0.4653
URBANNOW	1.14E-06	1.20E-06	0.049299	0.954	0.3408
MARR	-0.62316	3.209088	-0.01002	-0.194	0.8461
EDYRS	-0.90597	0.5887	-0.09184	-1.539	0.1245
LfExpX	1.609991	1.670395	0.049267	0.964	0.3356
Employer	1.023451	4.828434	0.010112	0.212	0.8322
Govt	-2.79889	3.281484	-0.04455	-0.853	0.3942
NonProfit	-8.20968	4.591308	-0.08485	-1.788	0.0744
FirmSize	-9.08E-05	4.06E-04	-0.01052	-0.224	0.8231
HRManag*	0.166504	0.059249	0.138653	2.81	0.0052
DownNext	0.018982	0.051854	0.017996	0.366	0.7145
JobSecr*	6.119786	5.886555	0.051046	1.04	0.2991
JbSuper*	8.115074	7.661024	0.060879	1.059	0.29
JbCmplx*	-3.4712	8.477752	-0.02447	-0.409	0.6824
JbAut*	0.129937	0.062542	0.107817	2.078	0.0383
OccStat	-6.26239	6.251947	-0.06342	-1.002	0.317
BlueCol	-11.4612	3.788659	-0.16881	-3.025	0.0026
WrkHrs2	0.035043	0.101577	0.017696	0.345	0.7303
JobTenur	-0.13666	0.147636	-0.04912	-0.926	0.3551
EARNINGS	2.30E-05	4.06E-05	0.030002	0.566	0.5717
LGTEFFRT	0.213023	0.090379	0.107845	2.357	0.0189
LGTFAMILY	-0.10659	0.060487	-0.0842	-1.762	0.0787
LGTCMPAR	-0.12373	0.088804	-0.06477	-1.393	0.1642
(Constant)	61.01315	13.86177	0	4.402	0

*Model 6: Adds perceptions about capability of poor and about necessity of profit*

R Square .26107

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
AGE	-0.309	0.134	-0.136	-2.30	0.022
MALE	-2.085	2.755	-0.038	-0.76	0.450
FASTAT	-0.026	0.048	-0.027	-0.55	0.584
PNTEDUC	-0.139	0.484	-0.014	-0.29	0.775
PNTPTYNM	0.039	0.028	0.058	1.36	0.174
NSIBS	-0.482	0.625	-0.033	-0.77	0.440
URBAN14	0.000	0.000	-0.019	-0.38	0.705
URBANNOW	0.000	0.000	0.041	0.83	0.406
MARR	-0.825	3.034	-0.013	-0.27	0.786
EDYRS	-0.368	0.573	-0.037	-0.64	0.521
LfExpX	1.279	1.580	0.039	0.81	0.419
Employer	-0.732	4.574	-0.007	-0.16	0.873
Govt	-1.756	3.105	-0.028	-0.57	0.572
NonProfit	-5.662	4.354	-0.059	-1.30	0.194
FirmSize	0.000	0.000	-0.006	-0.13	0.895
HRManag*	0.137	0.056	0.114	2.44	0.015
DownNext	0.041	0.049	0.039	0.84	0.403
JobSecr*	3.722	5.574	0.031	0.67	0.505
JbSuper*	5.542	7.253	0.042	0.76	0.445
JbCmplx*	-1.365	8.019	-0.010	-0.17	0.865
JbAut*	0.086	0.059	0.072	1.45	0.147
OccStat	-5.393	5.910	-0.055	-0.91	0.362
BlueCol	-11.123	3.584	-0.164	-3.10	0.002
WrkHrs2	0.026	0.096	0.013	0.27	0.790
JobTenur	-0.137	0.140	-0.049	-0.98	0.326
EARNINGS	0.000	0.000	0.008	0.17	0.867
LGTEFFRT	0.038	0.089	0.019	0.43	0.667
LGTFAMILY	-0.033	0.058	-0.026	-0.57	0.569
LGTCMPAR	-0.150	0.084	-0.079	-1.78	0.076
<b>Fn*Proft</b>	<b>0.347</b>	<b>0.074</b>	<b>0.224</b>	<b>4.68</b>	<b>0.000</b>
<b>Poor*Can</b>	<b>0.287</b>	<b>0.069</b>	<b>0.197</b>	<b>4.15</b>	<b>0.000</b>
(Constant)	34.507	13.783	0.000	2.50	0.013

*Model 7 adds orientations towards key players*

R Square .33598

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
AGE	-0.309	0.128	-0.137	-2.42	0.016
MALE	-1.979	2.627	-0.036	-0.75	0.452
FASTAT	-0.032	0.046	-0.033	-0.70	0.487
PNTEDUC	-0.099	0.461	-0.010	-0.21	0.831
PNTPTYNM	0.009	0.027	0.014	0.34	0.737
NSIBS	-0.630	0.596	-0.043	-1.06	0.291
URBAN14	0.000	0.000	-0.032	-0.69	0.489
URBANNOW	0.000	0.000	0.052	1.12	0.265
MARR	-0.753	2.887	-0.012	-0.26	0.795
EDYRS	-0.179	0.546	-0.018	-0.33	0.743
LfExpX	1.593	1.505	0.049	1.06	0.290
Employer	-2.040	4.356	-0.020	-0.47	0.640
Govt	0.254	2.975	0.004	0.09	0.932
NonProfit	-3.723	4.151	-0.038	-0.90	0.370
FirmSize	0.000	0.000	-0.001	-0.02	0.981
HRManag*	0.120	0.054	0.100	2.23	0.026
DownNext	0.036	0.047	0.034	0.77	0.440
JobSecr*	1.289	5.324	0.011	0.24	0.809
JbSuper*	1.793	6.922	0.013	0.26	0.796
JbCmplx*	-2.261	7.639	-0.016	-0.30	0.767
JbAut*	0.070	0.057	0.058	1.24	0.215
OccStat	-1.598	5.660	-0.016	-0.28	0.778
BlueCol	-8.436	3.442	-0.124	-2.45	0.015
WrkHrs2	0.049	0.092	0.025	0.53	0.596
JobTenur	-0.124	0.133	-0.045	-0.94	0.350
EARNINGS	0.000	0.000	0.008	0.18	0.861
LGTEFFRT	0.031	0.085	0.016	0.36	0.716
LGTFAMILY	0.017	0.056	0.013	0.30	0.766
LGTCMPAR	-0.088	0.083	-0.046	-1.06	0.288
Fn*Profit	0.249	0.073	0.161	3.41	0.001
Poor*Can	0.174	0.068	0.119	2.56	0.011
<b>ProTU*</b>	-0.456	0.072	-0.291	-6.31	0.000
<b>TrustBz*</b>	0.137	0.070	0.088	1.96	0.050
<b>EGovEco</b>	0.049	0.056	0.037	0.88	0.377
(Constant)	54.634	14.186	0.000	3.85	0.000

*Model 11: Individual bargaining: Deep background variables only, people out of the labour force*

R Square	.04096			
Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T
AGE	-0.095	0.081	-0.06	-1.164
MALE	-2.077	2.488	-0.04	-0.835
FASTAT	0.056	0.049	0.06	1.149
PNTEDUC	-0.334	0.509	-0.03	-0.656
PNTPTYNM	0.116	0.030	0.18	3.892
NSIBS	0.080	0.568	0.01	0.141
URBAN14	0.000	0.000	0.00	-0.096
(Constant)	60.314	7.678	0.00	7.856

*Model 12: Individual bargaining: Adds closer background variables, people out of the labour force. Variables newly entered at this stage are bolded.*

R Square	.05811			
Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T
AGE	-0.113	0.082	-0.067	-1.386
MALE	-1.007	2.508	-0.019	-0.402
FASTAT	0.093	0.051	0.099	1.839
PNTEDUC	-0.154	0.516	-0.016	-0.298
PNTPTYNM	0.126	0.030	0.196	4.215
NSIBS	-0.016	0.566	-0.001	-0.028
URBAN14	0.000	0.000	-0.002	-0.030
<b>URBANNOW</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>-0.013</b>	<b>-0.255</b>
<b>MARR</b>	<b>0.034</b>	<b>2.852</b>	<b>0.001</b>	<b>0.012</b>
<b>EDYRS</b>	<b>-1.331</b>	<b>0.461</b>	<b>-0.144</b>	<b>-2.885</b>
(Constant)	72.270	8.853	0.000	8.164

*Model 13: Individual bargaining: Adds family income.*

R Square .0588

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T
AGE	-0.099	0.085	-0.059	-1.167
MALE	-1.147	2.520	-0.022	-0.455
FASTAT	0.091	0.051	0.097	1.807
PNTEDUC	-0.144	0.516	-0.015	-0.279
PNTPTYNM	0.125	0.030	0.195	4.177
NSIBS	0.006	0.568	0.001	0.011
URBAN14	0.000	0.000	-0.003	-0.053
URBANNOW	0.000	0.000	-0.014	-0.286
MARR	-0.118	2.865	-0.002	-0.041
EDYRS	-1.366	0.465	-0.148	-2.936
<b>FAMINC</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>0.029</b>	<b>0.605</b>
(Constant)	71.281	9.008	0.000	7.913

*Model 14: Individual bargaining: Adds legitimate bases of reward.*

R Square .08066

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T
AGE	-0.107	0.085	-0.064	-1.262
MALE	-0.919	2.512	-0.017	-0.366
FASTAT	0.086	0.050	0.092	1.718
PNTEDUC	-0.145	0.512	-0.015	-0.283
PNTPTYNM	0.121	0.030	0.189	4.077
NSIBS	0.150	0.568	0.012	0.264
URBAN14	0.000	0.000	-0.007	-0.142
URBANNOW	0.000	0.000	-0.021	-0.416
MARR	0.085	2.866	0.001	0.030
EDYRS	-1.467	0.467	-0.159	-3.144
FAMINC	0.000	0.000	0.019	0.395
<b>LGTEFFRT</b>	<b>0.256</b>	<b>0.090</b>	<b>0.130</b>	<b>2.846</b>
<b>LGTFAMILY</b>	<b>-0.065</b>	<b>0.061</b>	<b>-0.052</b>	<b>-1.062</b>
<b>LGTCMPAR</b>	<b>-0.125</b>	<b>0.086</b>	<b>-0.068</b>	<b>-1.452</b>
(Constant)	63.700	11.740	0.000	5.426

*Model 15: Adds perceptions about capability of poor and about necessity of profit.*

R Square		.21212		
Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T
AGE	-0.138	0.079	-0.082	-1.746
MALE	-5.913	2.399	-0.112	-2.465
FASTAT	0.109	0.047	0.116	2.333
PNTEDUC	-0.287	0.476	-0.030	-0.603
PNTPTYNM	0.091	0.028	0.141	3.255
NSIBS	-0.234	0.529	-0.019	-0.442
URBAN14	0.000	0.000	-0.020	-0.404
URBANNOW	0.000	0.000	0.011	0.233
MARR	-0.657	2.661	-0.011	-0.247
EDYRS	-0.965	0.438	-0.105	-2.202
FAMINC	0.000	0.000	-0.010	-0.219
LGTEFFRT	0.107	0.085	0.054	1.254
LGTFAMILY	-0.037	0.057	-0.029	-0.645
LGTCMPAR	-0.096	0.080	-0.053	-1.204
<b>Fn*Profit</b>	<b>0.436</b>	<b>0.074</b>	<b>0.267</b>	<b>5.863</b>
<b>Poor*Can</b>	<b>0.318</b>	<b>0.066</b>	<b>0.215</b>	<b>4.782</b>
(Constant)	30.848	11.578	0.000	2.664

*Model 16 adds trust stuff*

R Square		.34447		
Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T
AGE	-0.172	0.073	-0.103	-2.362
MALE	-4.945	2.201	-0.093	-2.247
FASTAT	0.077	0.043	0.082	1.798
PNTEDUC	-0.270	0.438	-0.028	-0.616
PNTPTYNM	0.040	0.026	0.062	1.530
NSIBS	-0.383	0.488	-0.031	-0.785
URBAN14	0.000	0.000	-0.005	-0.119
URBANNOW	0.000	0.000	0.022	0.516
MARR	-0.881	2.438	-0.014	-0.361
EDYRS	-0.571	0.404	-0.062	-1.412
FAMINC	0.000	0.000	-0.038	-0.933
LGTEFFRT	0.053	0.079	0.027	0.670
LGTFAMILY	0.003	0.053	0.003	0.063
LGTCMPAR	0.027	0.075	0.015	0.357
Fn*Profit	0.281	0.071	0.172	3.961
Poor*Can	0.162	0.063	0.109	2.563
<b>ProTU*</b>	<b>-0.502</b>	<b>0.064</b>	<b>-0.340</b>	<b>-7.842</b>
<b>TrustBz*</b>	<b>0.317</b>	<b>0.065</b>	<b>0.210</b>	<b>4.898</b>
<b>EGovEco</b>	<b>-0.042</b>	<b>0.054</b>	<b>-0.032</b>	<b>-0.777</b>
(Constant)	54.153	11.810	0.000	4.585